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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates the impacts of transnational remittances and
the institutionalization of diaspora engagement on development in Africa.
Remittances to Africa are now around $50 billion annually and larger than inflows
of foreign aid and investment. African governments continue to realize the potential
contributions of their diasporas to development through not only remittances but
through skills, expertise-sharing, and coordination of efforts. In 2000, four African
countries had national-level institutions nominally dedicated to the diaspora and its
potential to effect development: now 36 of the 54 governments have such an
institution. An assessment of the political economy of remittances and
governmental diaspora institutions reveals structural challenges to leveraging the
contributions and skills of the diaspora for development. Through longitudinal
instrumental variables regression analysis, data from between 1990 and 2010 from
43 African countries are used to test the hypotheses that (1) as the ratio of
remittances to gross national income increases to a critical value, African states will
experience higher growth rates in human development, after reaching a critical
value, African states will experience lower growth rates in human development; and
(2) African states with a national-level formal institution of the diaspora will
experience higher growth rates in human development than those without such an
institution. The results show that smaller amounts of remittance are positively
associated with development and that larger amounts are negatively so.
Overreliance on remittances exposes a dearth of opportunities within a state’s
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borders and the costs to production and development of losing too many citizens to
outmigration. Though the analysis finds no statistically significant difference
between development in countries with and without national level diaspora
institutions, research reveals a common set of challenges for these budding
organizations: inadequate data, intergovernmental coordination, and resources.
Diasporic Africans stand to impact development on the continent now more than
ever. For development, African governments now must balance the challenges of
leveraging the skills and expertise of growing diasporas on one hand, and on the
other, managing migration by increasing institutional capacities so that citizens can
thrive and want to stay.
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CHAPTER ONE
AN INTRODUCTION
Processes of globalization over the last few decades – those of increasing
international interdependence and transnational integration – have thus far
arguably done little to equilibrate opportunities between the global North on one
hand and Africa and the rest of the “developing” world on the other. These
processes, however, have lowered transaction costs – including those of travel,
technology, and communication – associated with leaving one’s country of origin in
search of better opportunities elsewhere. By 2010, international migrants
numbered over 213 million, more than the entire population of Brazil, the world’s
fifth most populous state (Migration Policy Institute (MPI) 2012). Through formal
channels alone, those migrants sent almost $300 billion back home (World Bank
2011). Though neither the notion of migration nor the idea of emigrants sending
money home is new or unique to our times, unprecedented numbers of
transnational migrants and volumes of remittances at the start of the twenty-first
century call attention to a growing cadre of transnational political, economic, and
social actors. Particularly, growing numbers of diasporic actors have caught the eye
of home governments. Large numbers of developing states have begun to, at least
rhetorically, formally institutionalize engagement with their respective diasporas in
the name of development. In Africa, since 2000, the number of states with ministries
or other national-level offices of the diaspora has grown from four to over 30.
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My research considers these two, perhaps related, phenomena – growing
transnational remittances and the formal institutionalization of diaspora
engagement – as potential sources of “development from abroad” in Africa.
Specifically, I address questions about different levels of remittance: is any amount
of remittance beneficial for development? And, if so, how much may be too much,
suggesting genuine losses in potential progress and productivity at home due to the
depletion of human capital associated with migration? I also investigate the recent
growth of national ministries and other offices nominally dedicated to the diaspora
and consider their structures and functions, including why governments are
compelled to create such institutions and whether and how they facilitate diasporic
involvement in development processes at home.

REMITTANCES, DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT
Theoretical and empirical work on the development impacts of remittances
has been, until recent decades, mostly couched in a larger body of literature on
migration and development. Many, like De Haas (2010) and Gamlen (2010),
characterize trends in this larger literature as alternating periods of optimism and
pessimism depending upon concurrent prevailing paradigms in development theory
or circumstances in the international political economy. Both interpretations are
viable. For instance, functionalist and modernization (optimist) theories of
development in general in the 1950s and 1960s looked optimistically toward
migration and its impacts on development. On the other hand, after the oil crises of
the 1970s, retracting economies and surplus labor – hence decreased demand for
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labor (migration) – caused the industrialized nations to turn a pessimistic eye
toward migration-engendered development in the global South. Accordingly, in each
era if migration is viewed as “good” or “bad” for development, remittances are as
well.
THEORETICAL APPROACHES
In the decades immediately following WWII, economic development was the
goal of many strategies and topped the agendas of the new International Bank of
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Neoclassical or orthodox economic approaches to
development prevailed and theorized that migration for the sake of development –
transfers of value, balanced growth – was an appropriate option for many in
developing countries and regions (Harris and Todaro 1970; Ranis and Fei 1961).
Economists created formal models applicable to international migration as well as
rural-urban migration. Implicit in these models was the eventual and permanent
return of migrant workers, bringing with them capital as well as experience and
education, all of which they could apply at home for development. On the
microeconomic level, individuals in poor areas would rationalize decisions to
migrate based on expectations of increased income (Massey et al. 1993: 433-5).
Historical-structuralists (see Frank 1966) and dependency theorists (see
Cardoso and Faletto 1979) responded to neoclassical theories of migration and
development with the argument that the institutionalization of capitalism in the
international political economy had left many states in the global South in perpetual
3
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underdevelopment and subordinate to the industrialized North. Seemingly
unending demands for labor in developed states discouraged searches for alternate
employment at home and disincentivized innovation in the local and national
economies of the developing world (Cobbe 1982). Reichert (1981) called this the
“migrant syndrome”, in which there stood no end in sight to the depletion of labor
supplies and the attenuation of real development opportunities for citizens of
underdeveloped states. Preoccupation with “brain-drain” of highly-skilled/educated
citizens would surpass but not eclipse worries over losses in labor in the coming
decades, and remittances could not possibly compensate for the losses in
productivity and increases to prosperity that would have come without emigration
(Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975; Carrington 1999).
In the 1980s and 1990s, newer approaches surfaced, namely the New
Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) and interdisciplinary transnational
approaches. The NELM shifts the unit of analysis from the individual to the
household and conceptualizes migration and migration decisionmaking as
diversification of risk strategies for households in rural areas or poor countries.
Further, remittances can be a safety net and incoming capital to invest in additional
or more efficient production (Massey et al. 1993; Taylor 1999). Transnational
approaches view migration as a process involving individuals, households, extended
families, and communities at home as well as in intermediary and destination
locales. While they concentrate on the movements of people, goods, and ideas across
borders, proponents of transnational perspectives also focus on the people and
places, and socioeconomic and political institutions found within transnational
4
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networks (Basch et al. 2008; Glick Schiller 2009). Migration and remittances can
help or hurt development processes at home, but also have economic, psychological,
and sociocultural impacts on destinations and people. Transnational perspectives,
and to a lesser extent those of NELM, try to reconcile agency, structure, and context
in migration-development debates, which should be the goal of empirical work on
the development impacts of migration and remittances.
RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF REMITTANCE
Empirical research on transnational remittances has grown considerably
over the last two decades, due most likely to the increasing quantities of cash
crossing borders. Many studies are at the household level, fewer consider the
relationship between remittances and development on the national level, and all of
these (save a few) operationalize development narrowly as economic. Many studies
fail to address endogeneity questions of remittance: were those (households,
nations) that receive remittances already better off before migration? Finally,
quantitative studies tend to use invalid measurements for remittances, grouping
together traditional workers’ remittances with migrants’ transfers and employees’
compensation (explained below). Failing to attend to these concerns calls many
results into question.
Specific studies have shown that rural households receiving remittances are
more likely to escape poverty than those who do not receive them (Sander and
Maimbo 2008). Others have supported the idea that spillover effects can increase
opportunities beyond remittance-receiving households by increasing demand and
5
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creating jobs (Bardouille 2008; Chimhowu et al. 2005). Rarer studies
conceptualizing development in social terms have found that remittance-receiving
households had higher birth weights and that children averaged more schooling
than in non-recipient households (International Organization for Migration (IOM)
2006; Ratha 2009). Macroeconomic research, on the other hand, tends to show
negative relationships between remittances and development. Many empirical
studies assert that rising levels of remittances may stymie overall economic growth
(Barajas et al 2009; Chami et al. 2008; Singh, Haacker, and Lee 2009).
THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS OF THE DIASPORA
Remittances are not the only offering expatriates bring to the development
table. Growing numbers of developing countries are attempting to positively engage
their diasporas for development through the skills and networks diasporans have
acquired and built. Strategies for diaspora engagement are numerous. As stated
above, the institutionalization of diaspora engagement on the part of governments is
gaining popularity, especially in Africa. Just over five percent of African countries
had a national-level ministry or other agency a decade ago, and now over 60 percent
of African states have some type of diaspora engagement organization. Studies of
diaspora-engaging government institutions are scant, which is understandable since
most of them are very new.
The groundbreaking “Institutionalizing Diaspora Engagement within
Migrant-Origin Governments” by Aguinas (2009) researched 45 such institutions in
30 developing countries and overall found ambitions unmatched by capacities.

6
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Structurally, many institutions are found at the subministry level as a vice ministry
or directorate of the diaspora, though a number of developing countries have full
ministries of the diaspora. Other institutional arrangements are varied and include
the Office of the Diaspora within the Office of the President as in Sierra Leone and
the National Council on Mexicans Abroad (1-15).
Aguinas (2009) cites some of the same challenges to the effectiveness of
these institutions in general that other smaller-scale studies have found. Changes of
government, lack of coordination, and lack of reliable data on emigrants, diaspora
locales, and remittance volumes are common obstacles (African Diaspora Policy
Centre (ADPC) 2011; Plaza 2009). Some administrations virtually ignore diaspora
affairs offices established by previous presidents as in Nigeria in the 2000s. Many
governmental bureaucracies have multiple ministries, agencies, and offices at least
tangentially connected to expatriates and the diaspora and newly created
bureaucratic units only conflate already disorganized efforts. More empirical
research is needed on these nascent organizations and their effectiveness.

DEVELOPMENT FROM ABROAD FOR AFRICA?
Is it possible to cultivate “development from abroad” for Africa? Results from
previous studies discussed above are conflicting and consensus has yet to be
reached on this question. My research contributes to narrowing several lacunae in
the knowledge about the relationships between both transnational remittances and
the institutionalization of diaspora engagement with development processes at
home. I supplement the existing body of research in at least three ways: through my
7
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geographic focus and scope, holistic conceptualization of development, and
methodological approach. In this section I address each of these aspects in turn.
REMITTANCES TO AFRICA VIS-À-VIS OTHER DEVELOPING REGIONS
As noted above, most of the research on the development impacts of
transnational remittances and diaspora engagement focuses on the developing
regions other than Africa. It is important to study the impacts of remittances and
diaspora engagement in the developing world as a whole, yet just as important to
study their differing impacts across developing regions more equitably.
Remittances, in particular, as a form of transnational capital constitute different
portions of all transnational flows and therefore vary in significance dependent
upon region.
First, to understand their significance in the developing world, it is useful to
compare remittances to other transnational capital flows, namely official
development assistance (ODA, or aid, hereafter) and foreign direct investment
(FDI). Global remittances now far exceed global flows of aid. Figure 1.1 considers
the three flows of transnational capital to the developing world. To these countries,
FDI surpassed ODA flows in the early 1990s, and remittance did the same later in
the decade. In 2010, while FDI accounted for 52 percent of inward-bound capital to
the developing world, remittances made up 36 percent. Annual formal remittance
flows – at $250 billion – were almost three times those of aid and comprised over
two-thirds of the value of FDI. Furthermore, Figure 1.1 shows that the global
recession of 2008 saw a 36 percent drop in FDI to developing countries from 2008
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to 2009, while remittances only decreased by 5.5 percent, suggesting that
remittances are more reliable and robust to exogenous or global economic shocks
than are flows of directly business-related investments.
FIGURE 1.1 TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD1

To understand the idiosyncrasies of remittances across developing regions,
Figure 1.2 compares flows of transnational capital among these regions and
highlights the differences in its composition. Africa is distinctive in two ways. First,
it is the last of these developing regions to garner more remittances than aid, with
the former surpassing the latter in 2007. To Asia/Pacific, Eastern Europe/Central
Asia, and Latin America/Caribbean respectively, remittances surpassed aid flows in
1999, 2005, and 1994. Second, of the four developing regions represented, in Africa
the three flows are the most equal, that is to say remittances, aid, and FDI make up
roughly a third of total flows. In 2010, remittances were actually the largest of the
three at 36 percent, followed closely by FDI at 35 percent.
9
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FIGURE 1.2 TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS BY DEVELOPING REGION2

On par with the two other major forms of transnational inflows, remittances
to Africa may well prove to be more vital for development than other developing
regions. More research needs to focus on the role of remittances in development
processes in Africa. My research addresses this need by focusing on Africa and
including all countries for which data are available: 43 or four-fifths of countries on
the continent.
A HOLISTIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT
As pointed out above, studies of the remittance impacts on development
usually choose to operationalize development as wholly economic, while markedly

10
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fewer studies consider social aspects of development, namely education and health
as development. Only a handful of studies consider more than one of these three
aspects, and then do so separately. Development herein is characterized not only by
increases in incomes or economic productivity, but also by increasing access to
social institutions, such as those of education and health. The conceptualization of
development I use throughout highlights growing discursive trends that recognize
the necessity but not sufficiency of an economic component in the development of
states (Anand and Ravallion 1993; Sen 1999; Stiglitz 2002). Increases in gross
domestic product (GDP), for example, do not predictably translate to increased
political power, more education, or a higher degree of social inclusion for many or
most of a nation’s people. Development herein is defined as an historical process of
change working toward the betterment of a nation’s people through not only
increases in income, but through increased access to social services and institutions
as well, such as those of education and health (Sen 1999; Lindley 2010).
To complement the existing literature, my research posits as the outcome a
modified version of the Human Development Index (HDI), developed by the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP). As discussed in detail in Chapter Four, for
the quantitative analysis I calculate an index of gross national per capita production
purchasing power parity (GNPppp), expected years of schooling for children, and
life expectancy at birth. I do not attempt to take credit for the creation of such an
index; I only point out that this strategy is superior to those in the existing body of
literature that consider only one aspect of development or consider more than one
separately. Around 80 percent of transnational remittances are spent on immediate
11
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needs: food, housing, school fees, and access to healthcare (Bardouille 2008: 13).
Similarly, many programs involving diaspora-government coordination have as
their objective to build or provide access to schools or healthcare facilities.
Accordingly, as a minimum, studies of the impacts of transnational expatriate
contributions to development at home should all therefore conceive of development
as increases in education and healthcare access as well as increases in incomes.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
The methodological approaches I utilize to analyze the relationships between
(1) transnational remittances and development, and (2) formal institutionalization
of diaspora engagement and development augment the existing literature in at least
four ways. These include: more accurate measurement of remittances, accounting
for their potential endogeneity, using a deviation-from-fit measure for development,
and quantitatively modeling the association between formal government diaspora
institutions and development.
First and following Basch et al. (2008), I understand those expatriates who
maintain ties with their home countries as “transmigrants” and define this term as
those who emigrate and “develop and maintain multiple relationships—familial,
economic, social, organizational, religious, and political—that span borders” (263).
This specification – rather than emigrant, immigrant, or migrant – conveys the more
or less perpetual series of interactions among those who leave home and those who
remain.3 The maintenance of economic networks and relationships across borders
is most often performed through transnational remittances, defined as money sent
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home to family and friends by transmigrants. Though only these monies are what
most would conventionally consider as remittances, almost every study of
remittance groups these with two more quantities: “migrants’ transfers” and
“employees’ compensation”.
This specification is erroneous in most contexts. The three categories are
outlined by the IMF as part of annual balance-of-payments information. Migrants’
transfers represent the value of assets and capital transferred to a country by its
immigrants upon setting up residence, and therefore should not be counted as
conventional remittances. One particularly exemplary case cited by the IMF itself is
that of Bill Gates, a US citizen who in 2007 changed his residency – and thus
transferred $56 billion in assets – to Barbados (Chami et al. 2008: 4). In this extreme
case, classifying this migrant transfer as remittance would have greatly distorted the
true amount of remittances to Barbados.
“Employees’ compensation” in this context specifies salaries paid to nonresident citizens by resident businesses and thus – like migrants’ transfers – do not
constitute conventional remittances (Chami et al. 2008: 5). Salaries are incomes, not
formal transfers between non-residents and residents, and should not be confused
with remittances. Portions of these incomes formally transferred back home to
family and friends will be recorded as workers’ remittances, the more conventional
category, and accordingly then, should be included in analyses. Again, while most
studies of the impacts of remittances combine all three amounts – workers’
remittances, migrants’ transfers, and employees’ compensation – as “remittances”,
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my analysis which only considers the conventional category, stands to test the true
impacts of transnational remittances on development.
Second, I control for the potential endogeneity of transnational remittances
by using instrumental variables techniques; many previous studies have failed to do
so. Transnational remittances may be endogenous to development, and specifically
to measures of human development. In other words, citizens in countries with
higher rates of education, life expectancy, and income are more likely to have and to
take advantage of opportunities to emigrate than citizens of lesser developed
countries. More educated and healthier expatriates are more likely to obtain higherpaying employment as well. Instrumental variables techniques discussed more in
Chapter Four are a plausible strategy for removing the endogenous portion of
suspect variables through an additional stage of estimation.
Third, through one more stage of estimation I calculate a deviation-from-fit
measure as the dependent variable with the aim of comparing countries’ strides in
development to their development peers. As fully explained in Chapter Four, the
deviation-from-fit strategy starts with a growth equation for the modified HDI:
regressing changes in the index on starting levels and saving the residual values for
each country-year. These residuals measure excesses or shortcomings of countries
relative to other countries at similar starting points at a given time. This not only
allows for better comparisons and assessments, but also accounts for the reality that
more developed countries have less ground to cover in reaching development
aspirations than do less developed countries. Most analyses of remittance impacts
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posit as their outcome either the level of development or the change in development
and therefore do not account for initial levels or relative changes. My analysis more
accurately isolates the effects of remittances – and additionally, the effects of formal
governmental institutions of the diaspora.
Fourth, employing a longitudinal multinational quantitative approach to the
effects of these emergent diaspora institutions as my analysis does is unique. Due
mostly to the relative recentness of such institutions, most studies involving them
are descriptive. Extant research considers one institution or program, or searches
for descriptive commonalities and differences in their structures and/or functions.
By including the absence or presence of formal government institutions of the
diaspora in a large-scale longitudinal quantitative analysis, combined with the
operationalization of development discussed above, my research stands to measure
associations between strides in development and the presence of these institutions,
as compared to countries’ development peers without any such institution.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RESEARCH
In addition to filling gaps in the existing literature on the impacts of
remittances and the institutionalization of diaspora engagement, this research
presents useful information for policymakers. National, regional, and local
policymakers, IGOs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and diasporic
members and groups can find use for this research. Obtaining results that support
(or refute) the hypotheses herein will contribute to a better understanding of the
impacts of remittances and diaspora engagement for African development.
15
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First, there exists a lack of data on the existence of formal institutions of the
diaspora at the national-level across Africa. Since these institutions have grown in
number from four to over 30 just over the last decade, many development actors
can benefit from the dissemination of these data. Policymakers in destination
countries who seek to include resident diaspora groups in development efforts back
home, such as programs at US Agency for International Development (USAID)
(Newland 2010), can coordinate efforts with these emergent institutions and
increase ownership of development projects. Policymakers in the new diaspora
institutions can learn from and share strategies with their counterparts in other
African states. Other actors such as NGOs could also use this knowledge to connect
and facilitate relations between diaspora ministries or offices and diaspora groups
or issue-based groups. Finally, diaspora members and groups who are unaware of
the existence of these new government institutions can use this knowledge to
connect with their home governments with the aim of development.
Second, through the statistical technique of using the quadratic form of the
remittances-to-GNI ratio (explained in detail in Chapter Four) I can help
development actors and other academics to move beyond dichotomous
characterizations of remittance impacts. Through this approach, I expect to show
that small ratios of remittances-to-GNI are positive for development efforts. I also
expect to find that larger, inordinate amounts can be detrimental for development,
signifying losses in human capital as a reaction to domestic socioeconomic and/or
political conditions – or perhaps, to a lesser extent, external ones – which, in many
circumstances, small and regular infusions of cash at the household level cannot
16
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mitigate. Though some theorizing (de Haas 2010) has emphasized that remittance
impacts are diverse and dependent on actual amounts, most empirical studies argue
that remittances are either good or bad for development, as mentioned above.
Empirical evidence like that which I expect to show can help practitioners –
policymakers and development IGOs and NGOs – to recognize when too much
remittance as a proportion of income can sour development initiatives and suggest
ways to counteract this tendency.
Third, by analyzing together the development impacts of transnational
remittances and the institutionalization of diaspora engagement, I can create new
opportunities for these new government institutions to cooperate with diasporas
and influence the effects remittances have at home. In countries with larger-thanaverage ratios of remittances-to-income, diasporas and diaspora ministries and
offices can work together on financial literacy programs and/or individual savings
and investment plans for even a small portion of remitted funds. Efforts such as
these may help to begin to mitigate the losses in productivity and human capital that
come from disproportionate rates of emigration.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
Table 1.A presents the formal statements of the hypotheses I will test to
investigate the impacts of transnational remittance and diaspora-engaging
government institutions in Africa. The rationale driving the bifurcated hypothesis
regarding remittances – that small amounts with respect to income will be
positively associated with development growth while larger amounts will be
17
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negatively so – stems from two phenomena: the diversification of risk represented
by small amounts of remittance (say, five percent of GNI or below), and the
tendency toward dependence on one or another type of transnational capital inflow
when it garners a disproportionately large segment of income. First, and as
discussed in detail in the next chapter, the New Economics of Labor Migration
(NELM) perspective posits that for receiving households remittances can diversify
risk, act as a safety net for income fluctuations, and stimulate otherwise impossible
investments. Acknowledging the hazard of committing an ecological fallacy (King
1997), I test this theory in the aggregate level and posit that small amounts of
remittance with respect to national income can encourage development by
augmenting domestic income and investing in human capital (namely education and
healthcare).
TABLE 1.A RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
Research Question

(1). How do transnational
remittances impact processes of
development in Africa?

Hypothesis
(1a). As the ratio of remittances to gross national
income increases to a critical value, African states
from 1990 – 2010 will experience higher growth
rates in human development.
(1b). After reaching a critical value, as the ratio of
remittances to gross national income increases,
African states from 1990 – 2010 will experience
lower growth rates in human development.

(2). Do African states with formal
institutions of the diaspora see
greater strides in development than
those with no such institutions?

(2). African states with a national-level formal
institution of the diaspora will experience higher
growth rates in human development.
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To the second point, however, disproportionately large amounts of
remittance may have the opposite impact. In this respect, remittances and foreign
aid have common characteristics. Much of the aid literature addresses the
propensity for developing countries to become dependent on foreign aid for day-today operations and survival (see for example, Goldsmith 2001; Grant and Nijman
1998; Moyo 2009). Developing countries relying too heavily on remittances could
find themselves dependent upon these flows as well, and changes or interruptions
in remittance patterns (including foreign exchange fluctuations) could negatively
impact growth and sustainability in human development, especially when paired
with internal and external shocks to non-diversified domestic economies as is often
the case in the developing world.
Furthermore, the presence of steady and plentiful remittance flows can have
direct and indirect political effects. Developing country governments may be
tempted to shirk responsibilities for social programs and to relax fiscal discipline by
consuming or borrowing beyond their means, eventually sidelining their long-term
development goals (Akokpari 2006; Chami et al. 2008). Moreover, when expatriate
family members remit the means for meeting basic needs and subsequently
engender more complacent citizenries, authoritarian regimes may endure longer
than otherwise (Ahmed 2012). Having been more or less relieved of their Weberian
patrimonial duties to provide social protections and services – by a few hundred
dollars sent by each of a few hundred-thousand expats each month – dictatorial
rulers and their small coalitions can enjoy and enlarge their piece of the pie at the
expense of the country’s development. To account for the possibly duplicitous
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nature of remittance impacts as amounts grow, I hypothesize a curvilinear
relationship and operationalize remittances in the quadratic form for the
quantitative analysis.
For Hypothesis 2 in Table 1.1, I posit a positive relationship between the
presence of a national-level diaspora-engaging governmental institution and human
development. Since these institutions in Africa (and elsewhere) are diverse in
structure and most are relatively new – less than five or ten years old – finding a
measurable difference in development growth between countries with such an
institution and those without may be optimistic. However, I argue that governments
who attempt to engage their diasporas for development by erecting a (or an at least
rhetorically) dedicated ministry or agency stand to cultivate a more positive rapport
– over, of course, varying amounts of time – with their diaspora than governments
lacking a dedicated institution.

RESEARCH DESIGN
The research design I will utilize to test the hypotheses is mainly quantitative
in its approach. I will employ a two-stage instrumental variables cross-sectional
time-series regression technique. This covers 43 African countries over five fiveyear periods, from 1990 through 2010. The first stage regression uses instrumental
variables to control for the endogeneity of remittance flows by regressing the
measured ratio of remittance-to-GNI level of each country-year on the exogenous
regressor that captures global remittance trends, the median ratio for all other
remittance-receiving countries in Africa for the given year. The second stage utilizes
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the development deviation-from-fit measure as the dependent variable, which
measures a country’s successes or shortcomings in development against its
development peers. The predicted values for the ratios of remittances-to-GNI from
the second stage and their quadratic forms are regressors in this stage, as well as
the binary variable for the presence of a formal governmental diaspora institution
and control variables.
The lion’s share of the data comes from international governmental
organizations (IGOs): the World Bank, the UNDP, MPI, and the IMF. Variables from
these sources include the dependent variables used to construct the development
index; remittances, exports, aid, and income data; and HIV prevalence and migration
data. In addition, through various governmental and other sources I have compiled
data for national-level governmental institutions of the diaspora.
To augment the findings from the quantitative analysis, I also collect primary
data from informal interviews in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, primarily with members of
the diaspora who were visiting and/or investing in the city by building hotels and
other businesses. After several attempts to schedule interviews with civil servants
at the Directorate General of Diaspora Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Addis Ababa, I was only able to briefly speak with a few workers about their
diaspora programs and obtain standard information given to diasporic members
who make inquiries to the Directorate. While traveling to multiple countries’
diaspora ministries and offices and spending more time there would have been
optimal, resource constraints and the scope of this project only permitted a brief
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stay in one destination. The data I was able to procure gave me additional context
and a better understanding of government-diaspora relations in Ethiopia.

LOOKING AHEAD
In the face of increasing international migration which is likely to continue,
rising levels of transnational remittances on par with other primary financial flows
stand to greatly impact development in Africa in the twenty-first century.
Concurrently, growing numbers of diaspora ministries and other national-level
offices gain potential to become key development actors. Systematic analyses of the
impacts of transnational remittances and the institutionalization of diaspora
engagement in Africa are needed to fill gaps in an existing literature that favors
other regions and tends to use flawed operationalizations of what constitutes a
remittance. My research and analysis helps to fill these voids and has implications
for policymakers, senders and receivers of remittances, and diaspora groups.
The next chapter provides a survey of the existing relevant literature on
migration and development, transnational remittances and their impacts, and the
process of diaspora engagement. Chapter Three focuses on the key independent
variables in this study. I provide overviews of the growth and nature of
transnational remittances and the institutionalization of diaspora engagement in
Africa. Chapter Four begins by describing development in Africa in terms of
incomes, education, and health. I then present the control variables, explain the
methodological techniques that I employ, and end with the results of the analyses.
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Chapter Five summarizes, discusses the implications of this study, and posits
potential avenues of further research.
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NOTES: CHAPTER ONE
Graphs include developing countries from each region as specified by The World Bank as non-highincome countries (World Bank 2011). For Africa, each of the 53 countries was classified as
developing for the period of 1990 – 2010, save Equatorial Guinea. Equatorial Guinea is included in
the calculations for the graph to provide the most complete coverage as possible for Africa.
Furthermore, while ODA data is reported for every year shown for Equatorial Guinea, remittance
data are unavailable, and FDI data are available only from 1990 – 1996.
2 Same as above.
3 Though I employ transmigrant in references to remitters in the context of my own research, to
avoid anachronisms and with the aim of accurate representation I use the alternatives migrant,
immigrant, and emigrant purposefully in describing the work of others and when appropriate in
context
1
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CHAPTER TWO
MIGRATION, REMITTANCES, AND DEVELOPMENT
The impacts of remittances and migration on development have been
debated by policymakers and scholars since the 1950s. More recently, these debates
have included a focus on the role of diasporic communities on the social, economic,
and political development of home countries. The institutionalization of previously
informal engagement between diasporas and home governments for development
has led to the establishment of national level ministries and other offices, especially
in Africa. This has highlighted the importance of earlier theoretical debates of
whether remittances (and migration) were “helpful” or “harmful” for development
in home countries.1 This chapter is divided into four sections. The first considers the
discourse on migration and development, highlighting the role of remittances as
well as the ebbs and flows of optimism and pessimism that have generally
characterized the literature over the last few decades. I then narrow the focus and
survey the more recent theoretical and empirical discourse on transnational
remittances and development before exploring the newly emerging literature on
processes of diaspora engagement and their institutionalization. The fourth section
is a summary of the emergence of more complex approaches to migration,
remittances, and development in an increasingly globalized economy, characterized
by increased transnational linkages between diasporas and home governments.
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MIGRATION: “GOOD” OR “BAD” FOR DEVELOPMENT?
The larger body of theoretical and empirical work has historically alternated
between a dominantly optimistic view of the relationship between migration and
development and a pessimistic one (de Haas 2010). Unsurprisingly, if from a certain
perspective migration is seen as positive for development, remittances are as well,
and diasporas, expatriates, guest-workers, or temporary migrants (however
characterized) then become “agents of development” of one type or another for
home countries. Pessimistic views of the migration-development connection
highlight the overall losses from migration borne by sending regions – for instance
brain-drain and brawn-drain and exploitation of immigrant workers – that cannot
be mitigated with infusions of capital in the form of remittances and generally
deemphasize networks that connect diasporans to their home countries.
NEOCLASSICAL APPROACHES
In the decades immediately following World War II when international
economic “development” topped the foreign policy agendas of many states and was
a primary mandate for the emergent Bretton-Woods regime, views of the
relationship between migration and development were mostly optimistic. The
prevailing theories and analyses during the 1950s and 1960s – orthodox or
neoclassical economics approaches – for the most part posited a formulaic template
explicitly or implicitly based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international markets
and trade. The model (Ohlin 1933) focuses on the factors of production – land, labor,
and capital – and posits that equilibrium can be realized in the international
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economy through the movement and relocation of labor and capital. Labor-rich and
capital-scarce economies should export labor while capital-rich and labor-scarce
economies should export (or invest) capital elsewhere. Balanced growth in the
international economy is achieved through these movements.
Applying these tenets in a (mostly) domestic context, early neoclassical
economists (Harris and Todaro 1970; Ranis and Fei 1961; Sjaastad 1962; Todaro
1969) created equilibrium models to address underdevelopment and
unemployment problems in rural areas through labor migration to urban,
industrialized areas. Inherent in these arguments was the return of migrants,
bringing with them not only capital but the experiential and educational fruits of
their labors, all of which they could then utilize in economic development processes
at home. In this circular view of migration, the theoretical result is more balanced
growth between urban and rural sectors domestically and industrialized and
developing countries internationally. This balance will materialize through a
convergence in global wages, wherein migration out of labor-rich, capital-poor
countries drives up wages while decreasing wages in destination (labor-poor,
capital-rich) countries. Moreover, at the microeconomic level, neoclassical
economists theorized and modeled decisions to migrate through cost benefit
analyses acutely focused on the expected returns of labor at home versus those in
alternative destinations, which tended to favor perceptions of the increased benefits
of migration (Massey et al. 1993: 433-5).
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RESPONSES TO NEOCLASSICAL APPROACHES
HISTORICAL-STRUCTURALIST APPROACHES
By the late 1960s and beyond, it was becoming clear that global inequality
was rising, not declining. Rooted in critical Marxist traditions of class-based
explanations of domination and subordination, historical-structuralist approaches
began to gain momentum in theoretical debates and empirical discourse.
Significantly, A.G. Frank’s “The Development of Underdevelopment” (1966) and
Cardoso and Faletto’s work on dependency theory (1979) criticized neoclassical
development theory in general, beyond the issue of migration. In Frank’s
assessment, perpetual circumstances of underdevelopment had been established in
the global South alongside the institutionalization of capitalism in the international
political economy, a process and system controlled by the industrialized and
industrializing global North. For Frank, “underdevelopment” or economic
“backwardness” was not a state of nature but an inherent result of capitalist
endeavor through which metropoles exploited and expropriated resources from
Southern satellites. Similarly, states in the global South or “periphery” became
subservient and dependent upon northern, capitalist states in the “core” for Cardoso
and Faletto and other proponents of dependency theory. This body of literature,
chiefly the work of economists in or from Latin America, Asia, and sub-Saharan
Africa, signified a turn toward pessimistic views of migration-engendered
development.
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Concurrent and later empirical analyses focused more acutely on migration
and its impacts on development in source countries reflected this pessimism and
refuted the orthodox theories. In a case study of Basotho migrant workers in South
Africa, Cobbe (1982) draws two conclusions supporting dependency theory
assertions at the regional level. First, the historic trend of seemingly perpetual labor
demand in South Africa for Lesotho’s males continually minimized the necessity to
search for or create alternative means of employment at home in Lesotho (849).
Second, the exposure of inordinate numbers of Basotho workers to the standardsof-living in South Africa –five times those of Lesotho – diminished demand for goods
produced at home and altered consumption patterns that came to favor imported
products (850). Cobbe claims that, coupled with the historical lack of demand for
domestic employment, the decline in demand for domestically produced goods
stymied Lesotho’s development for decades at least. This conclusion also supports
what Reichert (1981) termed the “migrant syndrome,” asserting that migration robs
sending regions of their labor and capital, and attenuates and disincentivizes local
production of any sort (Massey et al. 1993; Taylor 1999). Though not always
explicitly, these arguments suggest that migrant workers and their families would
spend the lion’s share of capital sent or brought home – remittances – on imported
goods and therefore have negligible or negative development impacts.
To briefly cite two more examples, a 1966 study by the Organization of
Economic Development (OECD) “stressed that the acquisition of training and
experience by migrants in Europe is both difficult and rare…it is virtually impossible
to synchronize the demand for skills in regions of origin to the kinds of training
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received by immigrants in host countries” (Penninx 1982: 783). In his own review
of empirical studies of Turkish migration in the 1960s and 1970s, Penninx found
three common themes: that most migrants were not unemployed at the point of
migration; that workers from rural or domestic underdeveloped regions were less
likely to migrate; and that migrants’ education levels were higher than average in
Turkey (1982: 793). All these findings refuted the neoclassical views that returning
migrants would bring home a wealth of appropriate training or engender balanced
growth and development.
An important distinction to make is that while neoclassical approaches posit
a unidirectional argument, migration as a “cause” for development, historicalstructuralists view a two-way street: underdevelopment as the “cause” of migration,
a self-reinforcing mechanism that also perpetuates underdevelopment (Faist 2009).
Neoclassicists saw what migrants brought back: experience, education, and capital.
Historical-structuralists shifted focus to what the migrants took: labor and
education and remittances could not solve the underdevelopment conundrum
reinforced by the migration of labor and the educated masses, brawn-drain and
brain-drain respectively. These phenomena further entrench sending regions into
patterns of underdevelopment while increasing productivity in destination regions.
While neoclassicists argued that returning migrants would invest their capital in
increased productivity at home, critics emphasized that remittances are mainly
spent on consumption and rarely invested, therefore not contributing to
development. Furthermore and notwithstanding their uses, remittances cannot
compensate for the losses in productivity and prosperity due to increasing
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migration for historical-structuralists (De Hass 2006: 566; Goss and Lindquist
1995).
In particular, the issue of brain-drain from poor countries continues to
receive much attention in the migration discourse. The primary implication of braindrain is that investments in education cannot support growth or any development
returns for developing countries if many of its highly educated citizens leave
(Carrington 1999). The ones left behind are likely to be worse off by these
departures than before (Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975). By 1998, an estimated onethird of the populations with tertiary education from Africa, the Caribbean, and
Central America had emigrated to OECD countries (Ratha 2005: 38). Surveying 1000
expatriate Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa, Bloch (2005) found that 82
percent were university graduates and 38 percent of all those sampled in the UK
were active in healthcare or social work (6-7).
Beine et al. (2008) examine the effect of brain-drain in 120 developing
countries and find a positive or “brain gain” effect overall. The authors then pursue a
closer examination through a different quantitative approach that employs
counterfactuals to measure the country-specific impacts based on the level of
human capital formation at home along with the skill levels of migrants. In the case
of some developing countries – those possessing relatively low levels of human
capital coupled with low-skilled emigration patterns – a small positive effect (in
terms of human capital gains at home) is visible. However, slightly more countries in
the sample lose more high-skilled citizens to emigration, and in these cases the
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effect is negative, supporting the authors’ brain-drain hypothesis when examining
countries separately. Many small sub-Saharan African and Central American
countries are particularly vulnerable in this respect. Predictably, China, Brazil, and
India – most likely the three largest economies in the sample of developing
countries – are among those gaining human capital from emigration. These three
cases, the authors point out, tip the scales when examining the countries all at once
and inform the conclusion that the developing world experiences a net small but
positive gain from emigration.
Other authors have argued for brain gain in that increased demand abroad
for skilled workers stimulates domestic demand for education in developing
countries toward the goal of emigration. Due to policy environments and situational
circumstances that limit or prevent eventual emigration, not all those who seek and
receive education will emigrate, thus raising human capital via education rates at
home (Docquier and Marfouk 2006; Katz and Rapoport 2005; Stark et al. 1998). At
least two assumptions are inherent in these arguments: first that brain gain is more
likely under strict policy barriers around emigration, and second that educational
institutions are equipped to handle the increased demand (Gibson and Mckensie
2011: 119). To the first point, these types of policies are themselves likely to work
against development efforts and may be symptomatic of larger restrictive policy
environments. To the second point, developing countries, especially the poorest of
them, tend to lack the infrastructure to meet current demands on education. All of
these studies and the observations gleaned from them point to the importance of
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incorporating context into discussions of brain-drain or gain and all the effects of
migration more broadly.
NEW ECONOMICS OF LABOR MIGRATION
Though issues like brain-drain, brought to light by historical-structuralists,
persist in theory and practice through today, by the 1980s economists were
salvaging what they could from the earlier orthodox approaches and pushing
forward with a new optimism. In 1985, Stark and Bloom synthesized much of the
recent economic thinking toward migration and development under the label of the
“New Economics of Labor Migration” (NELM). Unlike the dependency and other
historical-structuralist arguments, NELM was and remains less a critique and more
a sophistication of the neoclassical approach. At least one author, Abreu (2010), has
recently all but labeled NELM a neoclassical wolf in sheep’s clothing. Other authors
such as Massey et al. (1993) drop the “labor” from the moniker and call the bundle
of approaches the “New Economics of Migration,” most likely to highlight its
differences from the more narrowly labor-focused neoclassical variant and to
emphasize its relative breadth of considerations. Notwithstanding these
disagreements, the introduction of NELM and its increased popularity through the
1990s marked a return to optimism for many in the migration and development
discourse.
The fundamental difference between the NELM approach and its neoclassical
antecedent is the unit of analysis. Neoclassical migration theories focused on the
individual and individual decisionmaking processes, and the NELM posits that the
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decision to migrate or not consciously involves a small group: the family, household,
or farm, or any small group in more or less close quarters composed of would-be
migrant(s) and non-migrants as the situation dictates.2 For Stark and Bloom,
changing the unit of analysis from the individual to the household “shifts the [very]
focus of migration theory” from an assertion of individual independence to one of
mutual interdependence within the household (1985: 174).
While one could argue that the expected return of migrants under
neoclassical prescriptions also constitutes mutual interdependence, involving entire
households in migration decisionmaking processes does so explicitly and removes
the often false sense of liminality or impermanence from decisions to migrate. The
notion of mutual independence is an important one, especially in terms of the
nature of remittances for the NELM approach. In this view, decisions to migrate and
potential remittances, unlike those professed by orthodox theories, go beyond
increasing incomes to loosen constraints on production and investment borne from
the relative absence of public and/or private insurance or safety nets in developing
regions compared to developed ones. Remittances not only increase incomes but
also: diversify risks if for instance crops fail at home or act as unemployment
insurance in case non-migrant household members lose jobs; and can provide
capital to start new projects in the absence of reliable and affordable credit markets
(Massey et al. 1993: 436-438; Taylor 1999: 64).
These observations point to a similarity between NELM and seemingly
opposing historical-structuralist arguments: the circularity of the migration-
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development relationship that neoclassical approaches missed. Historicalstructuralists see underdevelopment as the impetus for migration and then
migration itself affecting development at home. Proponents of NELM posit that the
constraints to prosperity found in poorer areas help to make migration an option in
the decisionmaking process, which also considers the expected impacts on wellbeing and development from the act of migration. One of the most important
differences between the two approaches lies, of course, in the quality of the
resultant impacts on development. Historical-structuralists and dependency
theorists claim that non-migrants will be worse off due to local and societal losses in
labor and skill, a discrepancy for which remittances cannot compensate. According
to NELM, the household diversification of risk along with remittances will increase
well-being and help to move along processes of development at home.
TRANSNATIONAL APPROACHES
Like the two previous schools-of-thought, transnational approaches also see
migration and decisions whether to do so as a perpetual process. More exactly,
transnational perspectives focus on the constant movements of people – along with
goods and services and ideas – across borders and the networks they build,
maintain, and expand. Many refer to these networks created through the
relationships transmigrants maintain as “transnational communities.” Glick Schiller
(2003) calls these networks “transnational social fields” and characterizes them as
multi-dimensional and multi-sited. Transnational social fields are found in the
interstices of states of origin and destination. They are a network of networks,
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encompassing public and private organizations such as churches, schools, interest
groups, government agencies and banking systems that connect those who leave
with those who stay behind. Proponents of transnational approaches to migration
and development claim that conceptualizing social relations in this way permits
scholars to transcend earlier, more static connotations of societies bounded by the
nation-state, all the while not forgetting the diversity and important roles of public
policies that constrain transnational action (Basch et al. 2008; Glick Schiller 2009).
Focused on the “betwixt and between” transnational approaches profess
neither the eminent return of migrant workers à la neoclassicists, nor the inexistent
or extremely low probability of emigrants’ return found in the dependency and
NELM theories. Rather, the perspective of transnationalism emphasizes the more or
less frequent transactions and communications occurring between those who leave
and those who stay behind, as well as temporary returns and visits (Faist 2009: 43).
It also stresses the role of transnational organizations, especially hometown
associations (HTAs), in maintaining relationships for transmigrants across locales.
These associations raise money for national and local projects, inform transmigrants
of sociopolitical developments, and reinforce ties with community at home.
Enduring institutions and ever-expanding linkages found in transnational
communities or “social fields” also help explain the persistence of remittances from
transmigrants who may never return home. Hometown associations and
transmigrant communities at-large exert social pressures to remit. In her research
on Somalis in London, Lindley’s respondents reported expected repercussions for
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not remitting, not only from home, but from other Somali-Londoners with whom
they live, work, or spend time (2010: 128-132). Though proponents of transnational
perspectives are neither necessarily pessimistic nor optimistic toward the
relationship between migration, remittances, and development, they tend to lean
toward optimism. Many have argued, as in the Somali-London case, that remittances
are a lifeline to otherwise dire straits, or that technological advances continue to
make migration easier – economically and psychologically – and more beneficial for
both transmigrants and non-migrants (De Haas 2010: 247). Most agree that the
impacts of social and economic remittances depend upon the social, economic, and
political environments in which they are given and received.
Recently, some transnationalists have envisaged remittances as an extension
of the ubiquitous neoliberal strategies that are continuously transferring
responsibilities from governments to citizens and private enterprise (Glick Schiller
2009; Phillips 2009). Neoliberal strategies invite citizens from developing regions
into the global economy as migrant labor through state-based incentives to migrate
such as training programs or the growing trend to legalize dual citizenship.
Remittances from workers then relieve pressure on governments to provide for
their citizens while the same neoliberal agendas of states and regions increasingly
privatize social services such as healthcare and education (Phillips 2009: 240-245).
For Glick Schiller, “remittance flows within a neo-liberal context highlight locational
disparities that are no longer addressed by state policies that would aim to even out
regional disparities” and therefore remittances can exacerbate (at least) geographic
inequalities in many contexts (24). In this view, the same ideology promoted by
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global power structures surfaces in different forms in different locales for
transmigrants – and receives diverse responses including remittances, activism,
movement, and adaptation.
EVALUATING APPROACHES TO MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT THEORY
It is this attention to context that underlines most contemporary
assessments of the utility of various strands of migration and development theory.
Hein de Haas (2010) concludes that the oscillation of prevailing optimism and
pessimism regarding migration and its effects on development since the 1950s is
primarily a reflection of paradigm shifts in more general social and development
theory: from functionalists and modernization theorists (optimists) to structuralists,
neo-Marxists, and dependency theorists (pessimists). The more recent NELM and
transnational approaches may have at first signified a shift back to optimism but are
really attempts to bring together agency (from neoclassical arguments) and
structure (from dependency theories).
Alan Gamlen (2010) offers a parallel explanation that whether current
theorizing surrounding the relationship between migration and development is
dominated by optimism or pessimism is a direct result of the environment of the
international political economy. In times of migration “booms” – i.e., the era of
economic expansion (in industrialized countries) in the 1960s and 1970s when
demand for migrant labor remained high – the discourse leaned toward a positive
view of migration and development as a way to achieve balanced growth. As a
reaction to migration “bust” cycles like those after the oil crisis of the 1970s, the
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discourse tended to favor an inverse relationship between migration and
development (2010). The explanations from de Haas and Gamlen are synthesized by
the assertions from Phillips and Glick Schiller above that theories of migration and
development are only as useful as they are aware of contemporarily prevailing
ideologies of global political economy and the ideas and forces of regional, local, and
transnational political economies. These insights guide my review and assessment
of current empirical research on remittances and development, to which I now turn.
TRANSNATIONAL REMITTANCES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS
Most studies of remittance and development are performed at the household
or community level through interviews and/or surveys. These address one
community or many communities either nationally or cross-nationally. Other
studies are case studies of the efforts to make remittances effective for development
on the part of particular governments or hometown associations (HTAs).3 A smaller
number of studies are cross-national and focus on the national level impacts of
remittances. Most of these implicitly follow the assumptions of NELM and point to a
rhetorical set of ‘sound’ macroeconomic policies and practices including the
expansion of financial infrastructures and diaspora engagement efforts (on the part
of governments) that are often elusive in developing nations, yet a necessary
component in facilitating development through remittances (Bardouille et al. 2008;
Maimbo and Ratha 2005). Still, all of these studies (save very few) operationalize
development narrowly, as either economic (increases in household or national
incomes), or social (access to education or healthcare). In this section I briefly

39
Chapter 2

Migration, Remittances, and Development

review previous studies of the development impacts of remittance in order to
situate my objectives to help fill the gaps in the larger body of research.
Studies of remittance focused on social development outcomes generally
employ surveys or interviews and conclude that remittances have a positive impact.
As part of a larger research agenda, analysts from the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) (2006) found that children from remittance-receiving households
in Mexico averaged between 0.7 and 1.6 more years of schooling than those in
households without the benefit of remittances. In Zimbabwe, households receiving
remittances were also found to have higher education levels than those without
remittances (Sander and Maimbo 2008: 63). Other studies have found that children
in remittance-receiving households have lower dropout rates and that these
households spend more on children’s tuition than non-receivers. Survey data from
Sri Lanka showed that those households receiving remittance had higher birth
weights than those not receiving remittances, which suggests that mothers in the
former had better access to healthcare (Ratha 2009: 30). A recurrent problem with
these studies and others like them is that most are cross-sectional, and those that
are longitudinal are so for a relatively short time, such as a year or two. They fail to
account for true longitudinal trends and preexisting circumstances and do not
address questions of endogeneity and reverse causation such as “were remittancereceiving households already better off – with more access to education and
healthcare – before the point of emigration?”
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Similar to studies concentrated on social development outcomes, research on
remittances and economic development outcomes at the household and community
levels tend to find a positive relationship. Sander and Maimbo (2008) administered
surveys throughout Burkina Faso and found that transnational remittances have
lowered rural households in poverty by seven percent and urban household rates by
three percent. Many studies at the community level point to the spillover effects of
more cash in local economies. This can increase local demand for goods and
services, and can lead to more jobs for non-remittance-receiving members of a
community (Bardouille 2008; Chimhowu et al 2005). In Egypt, remittances have
spurred the creation of non-agricultural small businesses, the services of which are
available to the greater community (IOM 2006: 53). In one rare study that
operationalized development as both social (as children’s educational attainment)
and as economic (as poverty reduction), Acosta et al. (2007) found that both
conceptualizations are positively influenced by remittances. Through household
surveys of communities nested across 11 Latin American countries, the authors
found a modest lowering of poverty rates due to remittances along with increased
educational attainment for children (conditional on parent education rates). Though
studies using economic outcomes as development are more often longitudinal, they
– like those with social outcomes above – narrowly conceptualize development as
one-dimensional, and have a predominant geographic focus in Latin America or
Southeast Asia, where remittances in the aggregate are greater than those to other
developing regions, namely Africa.
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Studies focused on the potential macroeconomic impacts of remittance – not
development per se – highlight the benefits of increased foreign exchange for
governments in developing nations. More foreign exchange can lower the relative
cost of development-related and other vital imports. Of course the political will
needs to be in place since, “whether or not the foreign exchange will actually be
spent on imports essential for development is, of course, a key issue” (IOM 2006:
54). Increased foreign exchange reserves can also buoy balance of payments
accounts and service external debt, which in turn can increase access to
international capital markets (Ratha 2009: 30). Securitization of future flows of
remittance can also make international capital more accessible. Several South
American nations including El Salvador, Brazil, and Peru have used securitized
future flows as collateral to raise capital internationally. Using securitized future
flows in this way is also generally less expensive than borrowing on sovereign credit
(IOM 2006: 55).
Extant macroeconomic research more acutely focused on development as an
outcome tends to show negative effects of increased remittances in developing
countries. In an empirical study for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Singh,
Haacker, and Lee (2009) found a negative relationship between growth in
remittances (as a ratio to GDP) and GDP growth in 36 sub-Saharan states from 2000
– 2005. Chami et al. (2008) point out that at the national level, there is a potential
for governments to become reliant on remittances. This may cause them to relax
fiscal policy discipline and start consuming or borrowing beyond their means,
especially in developing countries with low tax revenues and little room for error.
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Remittances may also cause governments to lose sight of long-term economic
development plans. Furthermore, continued remittance dependence might result in
a failure of economies to diversify (Akokpari 2006).
A few previous empirical studies have found that remittances have a positive
effect on measures of development. An integral part of modeling the effects of
remittances is controlling for their possible endogeneity or reverse causality with
the dependent variable. This is generally done with instrumental variable
techniques. In practice, acceptable candidates for instrumental variables must be
highly correlated with the endogenous variable but not with the dependent variable,
and only affect the dependent variable through the endogenous predictor
(Wooldridge 2002). The examples here are representative of the instrumenting
strategies in the remittance-development literature. Adams and Page (2005)
instrumented remittances with distance to the remittance-sending area (the US,
OECD Europe, or the Persian Gulf), secondary education rates and a measure of
government stability (in the home country) for an unbalanced panel of 71
developing countries from 1980 to 1997. They argued that the instruments are not
directly correlated with their dependent variable, poverty. One could plausibly
argue, though, that education rates and government stability are related to poverty
in developing countries. Their results showed that remittances play a positive role
in reducing poverty. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005) modeled remittances and
income growth using internal lags of both the dependent and endogenous righthand side variable in a system generalized method of moments estimator (GMM).4
The authors found that remittances have a positive effect on income growth in
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countries with relatively low financial development, but then a negative effect on
growth in countries with more developed financial sectors. To reach this conclusion,
they used interactions between remittances and a handful of financial depth
indicators from the banking sector (i.e., liquid liabilities, deposits, credit provided)
on a sample of 73 countries in five-year average panels from 1975 – 2002.
However, most extant empirical research tends to show negative effects of
increased remittances on macro-development in developing countries. Using two
ratios as instruments, a country’s income relative to US income and the country’s
real interest rate relative to that of the US, Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2003)
found a negative relationship between remittances and per capita GDP growth in 83
countries from 1970 to 1998. Here, normalizing the instruments by US income and
interest rates are truthfully just two variants of a country’s income and interest rate
and therefore most likely correlated with the dependent variable, income growth.
Singh, Haacker, and Lee (2009) found a negative relationship between growth in
remittances (as a ratio to GDP) and GDP growth in 36 sub-Saharan states from 2000
– 2005 using fixed effects and internal lags in a GMM estimator to account for the
endogeneity of remittances. Finally, employing the ratio of all other remittancereceiving countries’ remittances to their total income, Barajas et al. (2009) also
found a negative relationship between remittances and per capita GDP growth in a
sample of 84 countries in five-year periods from 1970 to 2004. The authors argue
that their instrument captures much of the exogenous portion of remittances by
focusing on their determinants: for instance, trends in the decisions of whether and
how much to remit and the transaction costs associated with doing so. By excluding
44

Combs

Development from Abroad?

each country in question when calculating the value of its respective instrument, the
authors contend that they are preserving the exogenous character of the
instrument.
With few exceptions, this body of mostly quantitative research tends to
simplify development as wholly economic, with the implication that social progress
will follow. In addition, most macroeconomic studies of remittances and their
impacts fail to separate the three categories of remittances as defined by the Bretton
Woods regime and thus (as discussed in Chapter One) conflate employees’
compensation and migrant’s transfers with workers’ remittances, when only the last
category describes what most observers would consider remittances in the
traditional sense (Barajas et al. 2009: 12-13). Furthermore, save the last few
examples and no matter the level of analysis, studies often fall short in addressing
the potential endogeneity of the remittance and development question: were some
(countries, households) already better off (more developed) – did increased
opportunities lead to more emigration which in turn led to more remittances to
become spuriously associated with higher levels of development?
As explained in detail in Chapters Three and Four, I address all of these
issues in turn. First, I define and operationalize development as social and economic,
using education, health, and income indicators. Second, following the IMF (the IGO
charged with collecting and classifying data on remittances), I isolate transnational
worker’s remittances to represent what most people in theory and practice consider
as “remittances”, and do not include cross-border compensation or one-time
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movements of capital and assets. Lastly, I attend to potential endogeneity concerns
through instrumental variables techniques, and thus account for the influences of
remittance levels stemming from variation in initial levels of development across
countries.
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT
No matter the relative level of social and economic prosperity, many
developing states realize that maintaining ties with their diasporas holds
opportunities beyond remittances. Strategies for diaspora engagement are
numerous and many governments are relative newcomers to the process.
Government-diaspora relations are as diverse as they are numerous, and it is
important to note that not all are positive. Some governments, such as Gabon and
Zimbabwe effectively have negative relationships with their respective diasporas.
Hopeful challengers of the Parti Democratique Gabonais (PDG) arguably have better
relationships with the Gabonese Diaspora than the ruling PDG itself. Opponents
often campaigned for funds and political support in Europe to challenge Omar
Bongo’s six terms and over four decades as president (1967 – 2009) and continue to
do so after his death and the subsequent ascendency of his son, Ali Bongo Ondimba,
to the presidency (BBC 2009). In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe has been
known to “blast those Zimbabweans who migrate for economic reasons and send
back remittances to their family members and relatives” rather than remaining at
home and working toward development (Bracking and Sachikonye 2009: 214).
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For the majority of countries that attempt to establish formal positive
relations with their diasporas, the act of “institutionalizing” diaspora engagement by
installing a national ministry or office dedicated to the diaspora is gaining
popularity. In Africa, national bureaucratic units nominally dedicated to diaspora
relations range from the “Diaspora Desk” under a Special Assistant to the President
to the Ministère des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur or Ministry of Senegalese Abroad.
Studies on the development impacts of diverse diaspora engagement efforts and
institutional performance yield varied results but tend to cite similar challenges: a
lack of capacity and coordination, a dearth of reliable data, unfamiliarity with
diasporic interests, and domestic politics (African Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC)
2011; Aguinas 2009; Plaza 2009; Ratha et al. 2011: 173). Below I review existing
knowledge on the structures and functions of national-level diaspora ministries,
agencies, and offices before returning to the challenges they face in making
engagement work for development.
Part of a larger IOM effort, Aguinas (2009) considered 45 diaspora-engaging
institutions across 30 developing countries (nine in Africa). Less than five years old,
this represents the first systematic cross-country examination of these mostly new
institutions. Aguinas found that most institutions operated at the national level as
ministries, subministries, or special offices or committees. Most of these institutions
are new and Aguinas points out high degrees of diversity in many aspects of their
structures and functions: place within the government hierarchy, relative power,
influence, resources, and effectiveness of each. Of the ministries some are dedicated
to the diaspora as their sole mandate: for example, the Ministry of Diaspora
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(Armenia) or the Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad. Others are hybrid or shared
ministries such as Somalia’s Ministry for Diaspora and Community Affairs. The
subministry level organizations are generally a vice ministry or directorate such as
the Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs Directorate General in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Other national offices and committees include the Interministerial
Committee for Chilean Communities Abroad and the Office of the Diaspora serving
Sierra Leone’s Office of the President (Aguinas 2009: 1-10).
With a few notable exceptions, large-scale diaspora engagement programs
and the further institutionalization of these efforts are a relatively new
phenomenon. Most of the institutions in Aguinas’ report were created in the 2000s
or the late 1990s. This makes judging their effectiveness difficult. A handful of
countries offer evidence of earlier success at diaspora engagement, with or without
an official government body nominally dedicated to the task. Israel since 1951 and
India since 1991 have had successful diaspora bond programs. Israel created the
Development Corporation for Israel as a parastatal in 1951 with the sole charge of
issuing its bonds, while India processes bonds through its central bank. Thus far,
Israel and India have garnered at least $25 billion and $10 billion respectively
(Ketkar and Ratha 2010). Through its Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State
Council and other government bodies, China began to forge strong ties with its
diaspora members following reforms in 1978 and now receives a substantial
portion – estimated at almost 50 percent – of its foreign direct investment from
expatriate communities (Bardouille 2008: 17).
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Like the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, nascent organizations for diaspora
engagement in other countries seldom act alone; they often operate within
networks of other, more established ministries or offices, including consulates and
embassies. Ghana’s Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations, for example, works
with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Women and Children’s Affairs, and Health and
Education as well as the Ghana Statistical Service and the National Population
Council (ADPC 2011: 7-8). These and more agencies have had success engaging the
Ghanaian Diaspora in the US, the UK, and various continental European nations by
encouraging not only more remittances through formal channels but also the
finance of infrastructural education and health projects such as the building of
middle schools and the maintenance of health clinics (Addison 2004).
While most diaspora-engaging government offices seek to engage diasporans
in development back home, some concentrate more acutely on the welfare of their
expatriates abroad. The Ministry for Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment
of Bangladesh and Egypt’s Ministry of Manpower and Emigration are two examples.
These ministries focus on helping emigrants to secure work abroad (Aguinas 2009).
Subministries, like the Department for Relations with Romanians Abroad under the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tend to focus on the objectives of the mother agency. Of
the 45 agencies Aguinas reviewed, she found no diaspora-engaging bodies directly
under an agency directly responsible for development planning (2009: 8).
For these reasons and more, the effectiveness of emergent diaspora
engagement institutions across the developing world depend on their individual
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mandates, their location in the bureaucracy, and the capacity of other government
bodies as well as that of the government overall. These observations point to the
challenges cited in extant reviews of the performance of such agencies. Comparing
diaspora engagement agencies in Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal, the ADPC recently
found three common obstacles, the first of which being a lack of consistency that
comes with regime alternation. For example, Ghana’s Ministry of Tourism and
Diaspora Relations lost the “and Diaspora Relations” from its name recently when a
new administration took over. Though the actual mandate of the ministry did not
change, this was a symbolic loss for Ghanaian government-diaspora relations. In
Nigeria, President Obasanjo’s promotion of diaspora engagement crystallized into
Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
2000. The new administration since 2009 “has not paid any particular attention to
diaspora issues” (ADPC 2011: 10-14, quote from 14). Ratha et al. (2011) also find
several diaspora engagement efforts abandoned through changes of government
and failures to maintain programs over time in other cases (173).
The second challenge the ADPC encountered was a lack of coordination – and
thus, the absence of a centralized, clearly articulated strategy – among the various
government agencies involved with the diaspora. Redundancies and “turf wars”
abound in Senegal among many agencies – and unlike Nigeria or Ghana – Senegal
has a ministry fully dedicated to diaspora relations (ADPC 2011: 15). Plaza (2009)
also cites a lack of coordination between consulates and mainland government
bodies in the arena of diaspora engagement.
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A third obstacle is that no government has complete data on the locations of
its diaspora (Plaza 2009). The ADPC report also found a paucity of data on the
magnitude and geography of migration as well as remittances; the data that were
available were sometimes contradictory in all three cases. Finally, in the
comprehensive report from Aguinas (2009), the author agrees that poor planning
and coordination often stymie the effectiveness of new government agencies of the
diaspora and offers more reasons: poor funding and a general lack of resources, and
unfamiliarity with diaspora interests and abilities. More research is needed on these
emergent institutions and their effectiveness at stimulating development through
facilitating diaspora engagement.

SUMMARY
Earlier debates on the impacts of remittances and migration on development
alternated between predominantly positive and negative assessments. In the new
millennium, a more complex discourse embedded in global economic, social, and
political transformations has emerged. This new discourse goes beyond previous
dichotomies and identifies the complex and diverse impacts of transnational
remittances in Africa and the developing world. Previous ebbs and flows of ideas
surrounding migration and its impacts on development in origin states and areas
reflected not only paradigm shifts in development theory, but conditions and events
in the international political economy as well. Orthodox economic theories saw
migration as an at least partial answer to the development quagmire in which many
states were embroiled in the 1950s and 1960s. Dependency theorists and historical51
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structuralists saw the spread and eventual primacy of capitalism in the international
political economy as the straw that broke the proverbial camel’s back in chronically
underdeveloped countries. Trapped in subordinate roles, the migration of citizens
or their potential remittances cannot help buoy ships that were perpetually sinking.
Indeed, for dependency theorists, migration depletes scarce resources – labor and
capital – and can further entrench origin countries and regions into
underdevelopment.
Proponents of the NELM see things somewhat differently. Households, not
individuals, make decisions about migration based on diversification of risks and
opportunities. In developing countries with unreliable credit markets and insurance
provisions – if any – migration of one or more household members while others stay
behind can be a survival strategy, or even one for prosperity. Remittances can be
used as insurance, but also as investment capital, to improve or diversify production
in households. Transnational approaches see remittances, transmigrants, and others
at “home” (whether it be families or communities) as part of larger transnational
networks. Advances in technology have arguably made migration and the
construction of transnational spaces easier, both economically and psychologically.
Remittances can help meet subsistence needs or even larger aspirations but are
neither inherently good nor bad for development in places of origin; rather they are
subject to the actors and sociocultural, economic, and political institutions in
various locations.
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Empirical research on the impacts of transnational remittances on
development has exploded in the last two decades due to absolute growth in these
flows as well as their relative growth and levels when compared to other
transnational flows like aid and FDI. A slight majority of studies of remittances uses
the household as unit of analysis and finds that those receiving remittances are
generally better off or made better off by remittances. Results from macroeconomic
studies tend to point the other direction and conclude remittances are inhibitive for
national growth. Most of these studies narrowly define development as solely
economic and/or inaccurately measure remittances, and in doing the latter capture
amounts that are not remittances in the traditionally accepted sense. Finally,
ministries and other government agencies charged with engaging the diaspora in
national development efforts are a relatively new phenomenon and come in all
shapes and sizes. Perhaps because of their recentness and in spite of their diversity,
many face common challenges: namely political inconsistencies, lack of
intergovernmental coordination, and a lack of funding and general resources. Listed
together, the obstacles for these new governmental diaspora ministries and
agencies read like a list of the “usual suspects” that plague most (development)
efforts in underdeveloped countries.
So what are the development impacts of transnational remittances and the
institutionalization of diaspora engagement in Africa? Does “development from
abroad” exist and if so can it occur in the face of the challenges seemingly inherent
to many African governments? In the next chapter I describe the growth of
transnational remittances to the continent over the last few decades at many levels
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of analysis. I also investigate the recent trend of institutionalizing diaspora
engagement for development and the establishment of ministries and other
agencies.
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NOTES: CHAPTER TWO
As discussed throughout the chapter, for decades much theoretical work considered migration (and
remittances) as either “good” for development, i.e., emigrants would return home with more
resources, or “bad” for development, i.e., emigrants either would not return (brain and brawn-drain)
or return with new skills and preferences unmatched by conditions in the home country. More
recently, debates have included more emphasis on the diverse and context-specific causes and
impacts of migration and remittances.
2 Hereafter I will use only household – as does much of the literature – to identify the unit of analysis
in the NELM for brevity and consistency.
3 Hometown associations are collective organizations of immigrants usually from a localized area (i.e.
towns, cities, regions) in the home country who raise money and other forms of support, as well as
awareness of sociopolitical issues back home. They work with host and home country governments,
other citizens groups, and nongovernmental organizations toward their goal of bettering the social,
economic, and political conditions in the home country.
4 The GMM estimator from Arellano and Bover (1995) is generally accepted in the econometric
literature as a valid instrumental technique, so long as the data exist for the adequate order and
number of lags.
1
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CHAPTER THREE
REMITTANCES AND DIASPORA INSTITUTIONS IN AFRICA
Often, citizens see more opportunities to improve their lives and enlarge
their capabilities – and those of family members – in neighboring countries or those
farther away. Indeed, the perception of increased opportunities is (an at least
implicit) motivation of emigration in all the theoretical frameworks in the
migration-development literature discussed in the previous chapter.1 Rates of
international migration are rising, and this phenomenon undoubtedly influences
(and is influenced by) development at home.
In this chapter, I review the current state of migration, remittances, and
governmental diaspora institutions in Africa. The next section describes rates of
migration and remittance across the continent, including discussions of the political
economy of remittances: informal v. formal channels of remittance, the distribution
of money transfer operators (MTOs), and issues of precision and accuracy in
measuring and comparing remittances. Section three considers the proliferation of
diaspora ministries and agencies in Africa, their missions, accomplishments, and
challenges; the last section provides a summary.

MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES
The latest estimates for countries’ international migrant stocks are from the
World Bank and were calculated for 2010 (World Bank 2013a). Compilers note the
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challenges to collecting data on international migrants – different classifications of
residents and citizens and different collection practices across countries, and of
course the issue of illegal or undocumented migration. They admit that “any
comparison of migrant stocks will be less than perfect. There is little choice but to
collect the data that individual countries themselves compile in its rawest form,
despite the heterogeneity that exists, and record it” (Parsons et al. 2005: 11). The
data come from a variety of country sources like censuses and population registers
along with original surveys and secondary sources from international institutions
like the OECD, the UN, and the International Labor Organization. They are then
checked against the latest migrant stocks reported by the UN Population Division
(Ratha and Shaw 2007).
The estimates indicate that around 30 million Africans (3 percent) reside in a
country other than that of their origin. Many if not most Africans who emigrate
remain in Africa (Tables A3.A-E in the appendix show the top five emigration
destinations for each country). Two-thirds of sub-Saharan emigrants stay south of
the Sahara and most of those remain in the respective sub-region (Ratha et al 2011:
1-2). Seventy-three countries have over 10,000 emigrants of African origin and 40 of
these countries are in Africa. Figure 3.1 shows the top destination countries for
African emigrants. The second largest destination is Côte d’Ivoire, with over 2
million African emigrants, mostly from neighboring Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea.2
South Africa is home to almost 2 million emigrant Africans and Burkina Faso and
Nigeria each have around 1 million. Outside of Africa, with almost 10 percent of
Africa’s emigrants, France is the top destination country for Africans. Saudi Arabia,
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the US, and the UK also have relatively large stocks of African emigrants,
representing around five percent of emigrating Africans each. These transplanted
Africans significantly impact both the development trends in their host countries
where they provide labor and skills and in their home countries to which they send
remittance.

FIGURE 3.1 MIGRATION DESTINATION COUNTRIES, 2010 ESTIMATES
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It is significant that in 2010 the 30 million African emigrants sent almost $47
billion home in remittances through formal services and institutions. The average
quantity for individual remittance transactions to African recipients was about $100
sent monthly. Of this amount, an estimated 80 percent is spent on basic needs for
the family: for food, housing, education, and healthcare (Bardouille 2008: 13).
Measuring exact inflows of remittances remains virtually impossible due partly to
differences in categorizing and reporting methods across countries. More
importantly, though, the difficulty in obtaining precise figures of remittance is due
to the frequent resort to informal channels by emigrants relying on familial,
communal, and/or regional networks.
INFORMAL VERSUS FORMAL REMITTANCE IN AFRICA
Informal money transfer networks have a long history in Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East, and many channels employed today are part of or modeled after the
centuries-old institutions of hawala and hundi. Meaning ‘transfer’ in Arabic, the
former describes the (mostly) Middle Eastern practice of physically carrying cash or
other objects of value between places, usually across borders. The latter, hundi, has
a similar connotation on the South Asian subcontinent. These systems can include
informal bank drafts of transfer, for which cash need not be immediately or directly
transported but rather dispensed through informal accounts of debts and credits
among families or extra-familial networks (Sander and Maimbo 2008: 65-66). Four
major conditions contribute to the persistence of informal channels in Africa. First,
relatively few financial institutions are allowed to handle remittances as officially
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licensed money transfer operators (MTOs). Second, formal channels are often costprohibitive due at least partly to a lack of competition and third, mistrust and
instability of governmental and formal economic institutions – though perhaps
improving – are common. Lastly, many Africans are “unbanked”: the proportion of
those who do not use banks is higher than in any other region.
The post 9-11 period introduced a major barrier-to-entry into the remittance
market in Africa when the Bretton Woods Institutions declared stringent
international financial regulations toward anti-money laundering and combating
the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT), also referred to as ‘know-your-customer’
(KYC) rules. These rules involve the uniform documentation for transnational
capital in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the US. Although relatively
effective at curbing money-laundering and identifying possible terrorist-financing
schemes, they also hinder legitimate workers’ use of formal institutions to send
money internationally to families back home (IMF 2005). These rules are often costprohibitive when smaller MTOs and micro-finance institutions need to procure
licenses for international transfers. Ironically, the KYC rules play a role in the
perpetuation of informally transmitted remittance, though anti-terrorist financing
and anti-money-laundering are their chief raisons-d’être.
Some African MTOs have persevered through the changes in international
finance regulation and others have begun or expanded service more recently.
Dahabshil started in Somalia over 40 years ago and is now headquartered in United
Arab Emirates, with outlets in 150 countries including those in the horn of Africa
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and over 220 outlets in Somalia (Dahabshil 2013). For inter-African transfers,
Ecobank, based in Lome, Togo, has over 750 locations in 32 African countries3 and
France (Ecobank 2013). Safaricom in Kenya has partnered with Western Union
through its M-Pesa program to extend the successful domestic mobile phone
banking and money transfer services internationally to 45 countries including the
US and Canada, most countries in Europe and the Arabian Peninsula, and 13 African
countries.4 In 2009, Nigeria’s Virtual Terminal Network (VTN) began a similar
partnership with Western Union to offer mobile transfers (Safaricom 2013; VTN
2013).
Despite the existence of these and other regional MTOs in Africa, two of the
oldest companies in the business, Western Union and MoneyGram, control 65
percent of payout locations in Africa. Both companies also seek (and generally
obtain) exclusivity agreements with bank and post office partners, essentially
barring competition in many African countries and keeping fees associated with
remittance high (IFAD 2010). At least partly due to pressure from diaspora groups,
governments (including Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Rwanda) have recently begun
to ban the exclusivity agreements in efforts to increase competition and bring down
remittance prices (Ratha et al 2011). However, with over 30,000 and 20,000 outlets
in Africa respectively, Western Union and MoneyGram continue to dominate the
remittance market.
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FIGURE 3.2 WESTERN UNION AND MONEYGRAM OUTLETS, AFRICA 2013
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Figure 3.2 shows the combined distribution of Western Union and
MoneyGram payout locations in Africa by country (Table A3.F in the appendix
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shows the estimated number of locations by country)5. Unsurprisingly, the number
of outlets is highly correlated with the amount of remittances a country receives.6 In
countries with a dearth of Western Union and MoneyGram outlets like Eritrea and
Somalia (22 and four outlets respectively), one or a few smaller, regional MTOs
generally fill the gap. Transhorn Money Transfer specializes in sending money to
Asmara and other Eritrean locales, and as mentioned above, Dahabshil pays out
remittances in over 200 Somali locations (Transhorn Money Transfer 2013).
However, most countries have an abundance of Western Union and
MoneyGram locations. Of the ten countries with over 1,000 outlets, Morocco and
Nigeria (two of the top remittance earners) have over 12,000 and 8,000 payout
locations respectively, far more than the other 52 countries. With around 3,000
outlets, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Senegal round out the top five most saturated
countries in terms of Western Union and MoneyGram locations.
The near duopolistic market helps to make Africa the most expensive place
for remittances in the world. Compared to other regions, Africa endures relatively
high costs, from 8 to 12 percent more for receiving remittances (Bardouille 2008:
11). For example, sending $200 from the US to Pakistan or The Philippines currently
costs 7 to 8 percent via MoneyGram and Western Union. The same amount from the
US to Ghana incurs 11 percent (MoneyGram) and 18 percent (Western Union)
charges respectively (World Bank 2011c). Also, intra-African transfers are even
more costly than those from outside the continent and can take longer to process.
To send the same amount to Zambia from the UK or South Africa costs 15 percent
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and 25 percent on average respectively. Furthermore, sending money from South
Africa to Lesotho (consequently surrounded by the former) costs on average 12
percent of the amount sent (IFAD 2010).
The wait times and high fees associated with remittances are so quotidian
and ubiquitous that they have found their way into popular culture. Somali rapper
K’naan’s 2009 song “15 Minutes Away” is dedicated to “‘everybody that’s had to wait
on a money transfer’ and complains, ‘it’s kind of wack when they charge you like 10
percent on the dollar’” (Terry 2013). In 2009, the G8 adopted the “5X5” objective,
aimed at reducing average global remittance costs by five percent (from ten to five
percent) in five years (by 2014). The initiative invites governments to adopt policies
and practices proven effective in helping to reduce remittance costs such as
increasing transparency and enhancing competition (Italian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2009).7 Four years later, the global average cost of remittance has decreased,
though only by a meager one percent (currently 9.05 percent), suggesting that “5X5”
goal may have been overly ambitious (World Bank 2013c). Furthermore, for Africa,
remittance prices have increased from 11 to 12 percent since 2011 (Send Money
Africa 2013). The impacts of these high costs are well-known: “[b]ringing
remittance prices down to 5 percent from the current 12.4 percent average cost
would put US$4 billion more in the pockets of Africa's migrants and their families
who rely on remittances for survival” (World Bank 2013d). All else equal, this would
represent a 10 percent increase in formal remittances to the continent.
Undoubtedly, lowering remittance prices in Africa and increasing use of formal
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channels will require enhanced competition for Western Union and MoneyGram
from other MTOs and the phasing out of exclusivity agreements.
It is not surprising then that informal remittance structures persist, not only
in the face of high fees, but also vis-à-vis political instability and/or unreliable
national macroeconomic environments and practices. When banks are
intermittently or consistently weak, or when remittance is subject to high direct
taxation or multiple fee collections, informal institutions can seem a better option
for remittance senders and receivers. The outcome is that lack of trust in the public
sector is offset with the trust in personal, face-to-face relationships on each end of
informal remittance transactions.
In general, banks and financial sectors in Africa have become more stable
over the last two decades, which eventually should encourage more citizens to use
formal channels for remittances (Honohan and Beck 2007). However, infrastructure
remains a challenge, and Africans are the least “banked” population in the world.
Figure 3.3 compares commercial bank use and access across the world’s four
developing regions using country averages. Almost 30 percent (295 per 1,000) of
adults in Africa deposit or borrow from banks, just behind the proportion in the
more populous Asia/Pacific region. Africans are less than half as likely to use banks
as citizens in Eastern Europe/Central Asia and Latin America.
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FIGURE 3.3 BANK USE AND ACCESS: DEVELOPING REGION COMPARISONS

Financial literacy programs can help to encourage more citizens to make use
of banks. Studies of financial literacy programs in Eastern Europe and Latin America
show that after receiving financial education 80 percent of unbanked people express
new interest in using banks (IFAD 2010: 16). Such programs are less pervasive but
becoming more popular across Africa, wherein public and/or private actors (i.e.,
national credit regulators and microfinance associations) provide workshops or air
media messages educating the public about financial institutions in countries such
as Kenya, South Africa, Tunisia, and Uganda (Beck et al 2011: 106).
While financial literacy programs can be successful at increasing interest in
using formal institutions, infrastructure remains a challenge in many African
countries. On average, fewer than 50 commercial bank branches and ATMs are
available for every 1,000,000 adults (one bank outlet for every 20,000 adults), a
figure much lower than the other three developing regions (Figure 3.3). While
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mobile banking programs (like Kenya’s M-Pesa discussed above) have been
successful and could represent an opportunity for African countries to “leap-frog”
some infrastructural deficiencies, increasing access to physical branches and ATMs
could also encourage more citizens to use banks and expand options for sending and
receiving remittance through formal channels.
MEASURING FORMAL REMITTANCE FLOWS
Only formal flows of remittance can be measured as a proxy for total
remittances; and measuring formal flows is complicated by inconsistent reporting
on the part of governments. Remittance reporting is intermittent at best for many
African countries, with no clear pattern (based on income, government type, etc.)
emerging among those who do report remittances to the IMF and those who do not
for a given year or all years. Of 53 countries, any number from 21 to 40 of them
reported remittances each year from 1980 through 2010.
The top chart in Figure 3.4 shows remittances in Africa for the last three
decades (the solid line), along with the number of countries reporting remittances
each year (the dashed line). Plotting both on the same graph allows readers to see
the influence of inconsistent reporting on the actual amount reported. To better
measure increases in remittances to the continent one should consider the average
levels within countries and compare those over time. The bottom left chart in Figure
3.4 does this. Median levels of remittance have increased over time, especially in
the last decade when the average grew over fourfold from below $20 million to $80
million.8 The bottom right chart shows remittances as a percent of income. The
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solid line shows the aggregate value for all countries reporting while the dashed line
represents the median remittances by country as a percent of income. Both of these
measures have also increased since 2000, with the median percentage more than
doubling from 0.66 percent to 1.72 percent in one decade, meaning that remittances
are garnering a larger portion of African income.
FIGURE 3.4 REMITTANCES AND INCOME, 1980 – 2010

Also interesting in the bottom two charts (Figure 3.4) are the large spikes in
both remittances and remittances as a percent of income in the early 1990s. The
lion’s share of this short-term rise can be traced back to four countries: Ghana,
Madagascar, Mauritania, and Nigeria. Figure 3.5 shows changes to remittances and
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to income in the 1990s for all four countries. Flooding, ethnic conflicts in the north,
and bureaucratic restructuring during the transition to democracy saw Ghana’s
income fall by 14 percent in 1993 (Aryeetey, Fosu, and Bawumia 2001). At least
partly in response to these processes, remittances rose by 38 and 55 percent in
1993 and 1994 to $10 and $16 million respectively. Interestingly, in 1996, during
the country’s second democratic elections, remittances rose again by 60 percent to
$27.5 million. In Madagascar – aided by a 95 percent increase in remittances, from
$4.5 to almost $9 million – pro-democracy strikes and demonstrations in 1991
against the socialist quasi-military government resulted in the dissolution of
government by then president, Didier Ratsiraka. A new, democratic constitution
would be ratified the following year, but uncertainty during the political transition
saw income fall 15 percent (Banks, Miller, and Overstreet 2007: 524-526).
FIGURE 3.5 REMITTANCE SPIKES IN THE 1990S
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The introduction of a preferential exchange rate in Mauritania in late 1991
saw an increase in remittances in 1992: from just over $1 million to $5 million. The
rate was eliminated in 1993 and remittances fell by 95 percent (IMF 1995). The
country’s first multiparty elections were also held in 1992 (Banks, Miller, and
Overstreet 2077: 572). Though Nigeria also held elections in its year of marked
increase in remittances, 1993, much of the dramatic spike – from $56 to almost
$800 million – is most likely due to sweeping economic reforms in 1993 that freed
interest rates and introduced new tax structures. This and the subsequent
depreciation of the Nigerian currency made dollars and sterling pounds more
valuable inside Nigeria. The exchange rate for Nigerian Naira doubled from under
N10 per $1 to N22 per $1 from 1991 – 1993 and has continued to increase
incrementally, much like remittances, ever since (Imimole and Enoma 2011).

TABLE 3.A TOP 10 REMITTANCE RECEIVERS, 2010
By Gross Remittance
Remittance
Country
(millions) (% GNI)
Nigeria
$19,651
Egypt
$12,453
Morocco
$6,423
Tunisia
$1,725
Senegal
$1,384
Sudan
$1,291
Uganda
$768
Kenya
$686
Mali
$437
Ethiopia
$345
Source: World Bank 2011

10.9%
5.7%
6.9%
4.1%
11.0%
1.7%
4.6%
2.1%
4.8%
1.3%

Country

By Percent of GNI
Remittance
(millions)

Gambia
Senegal
Nigeria
Togo
Cape Verde
Morocco
Egypt
Guinea-Bissau
Mali
Uganda

$107
$1,384
$19,650
$301
$130
$6,423
$12,453
$44
$437
$768

(% GNI)
11.4%
11.0%
10.9%
9.5%
8.4%
6.9%
5.7%
5.4%
4.8%
4.6%

Nigeria, with over 360,000 (approximately one-third) of its emigrants in the
UK and the US receives the most remittances in Africa (see Table A3.E in the
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appendix). As shown in Table 3.A it received almost $20 billion in 2010 (Table A3.G
in the appendix contains data for all reporting countries). As of 2006, sixty percent
of Nigeria’s remittances were sent to Lagos, and 15 percent go to Abuja, leaving only
25 percent received directly in the vast remainder of the country. However, some of
these remitted funds are forwarded inland from principal cities via informal
channels such as taxi and bus drivers or family members (Hernandez-Coss and Bun
2006: 13). Five other countries received over $1 billion: Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia,
Senegal, and Sudan.
The right side of Table 3.C shows the 10 countries with the highest
percentages of remittances to income indicating higher degrees of remittance
dependence. Cape Verde, Senegal, and Nigeria receive more than 10 percent of gross
national income from remittances. Cape Verde and The Gambia are ranked fifth and
first and these two countries lose the largest percentages of tertiary-educated
citizens in Africa: 67.5 percent (Cape Verde) and 63.3 percent (The Gambia),
indicative of brain-drain (World Bank 2011b). Eight other countries lose more than
35 percent of their skilled labor: Mauritius (56 percent), Seychelles (56 percent),
Sierra Leone (53 percent), Ghana (47 percent), Mozambique (45 percent), Liberia
(45 percent), Kenya (38 percent) and Uganda (36 percent) (Lututala 2012: 6).On
average, African countries lose 19 percent of their doctors (IOM 2009). In the US
alone, 2009 census results indicated 1.5 million African emigrants who, on average,
were more skilled than both other immigrants and non-immigrants. Even though
remittances may slightly mitigate the negative impacts of emigration from African
countries, the brain-drain “denies, in short, the continent of the human, financial,
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economic and political capital needed to advance its development and the
contributions of migrants to the development of their countries of origin do not
seem to offset the initial consequences of brain-drain” (Lututala 2012: 18).

GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE DIASPORA
By and large, members of the diaspora do maintain socioeconomic and
political ties with their home countries. Thus it is not surprising that governments
have begun to formulate policies to formalize and institutionalize these linkages.
Two-thirds of African states have created an office, subministry, shared ministry, or
ministry of the diaspora.9 Following Aguinas (2009) as discussed in Chapter Two, I
categorize these institutions by their respective places in the government
bureaucracy. Ministries are full ministries in the cabinet nominally dedicated to the
diaspora, such as Cape Verde’s Ministry of Emigrant Communities or Morocco’s
Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad. Shared Ministries are ministries
that have multiple areas of responsibility which include diaspora relations, like
Guinea-Bissau’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and the
Diaspora or Ghana’s Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations. Subministries are
departments or directorates within a ministry, like Burundi’s Directorate of the
Diaspora or Nigeria’s Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization. All of the
subministries in African governments are located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
or its equivalent. Finally, other offices are those housed outside the cabinet.
Currently, there are three such offices: Malawi’s Diaspora Affairs Unit and Sierra
Leone’s Office of the Diaspora, both of which are in the Office of the President, and
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Zambia’s Diaspora Desk, located in the Office of the Special Assistant to the
President, Economic and Development Affairs.
FIGURE 3.4 THE RISE OF GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE DIASPORA

Figure 3.4 highlights the rapid growth of governmental diaspora-engaging
institutions in Africa. At the start of 2013, five countries have a full ministry, nine
countries have a shared ministry, and the most common type of governmental
diaspora institution is the subministry, created by 19 countries. Table A3.H in the
appendix shows the full list of governmental diaspora institutions. Some institutions
have been reshuffled since their creation. Tunisia created a subministry in the
Ministry of Social Affairs in 1988, which was the first on the continent. In 2005, the
ministry was redesigned as the Ministry of Social Affairs, Solidarity, and Tunisians
Abroad (Tunisian Government 2013). Cape Verde created an Institute of Emigrant
Communities in 2001 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and replaced it with the full
Ministry of Emigrant Communities in 2010 (ICMPD and IOM 2010).10 The newest (as
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of early 2014) is Equatorial Guinea’s Directorate of the Diaspora in its Ministry of
Foreign Affairs created in the spring of 2013. Table 3.B lists the countries by type of
institution.
TABLE 3.B COUNTRIES BY TYPE OF DIASPORA INSTITUTION, 2013

The missions of the various institutions are diverse and mostly expressed as
broad ambitions for the future. Most of them contain some reference to involving
the diaspora in the development or the socioeconomic activities of the country. For
instance, Sierra Leone’s Office of the Diaspora created in 2007 is meant to harness
the potential in the diaspora to address “critical capacity gaps in the government”
and the Ministry of Diaspora and Community Relations in Somalia created in 2009
plans to set up departments that focus on financial and human resources in the
diaspora for Somalia (Martin 2009: 9).
Ethiopia’s Diaspora Engagement Affairs General Directorate has in its
mission that it “Encourages the active involvement of the Ethiopians in Diaspora in
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socio-economic activities of the country” (Ethiopian Government 2009). While Plaza
(2009) cites that governments’ lack of data on the size and location of their
diasporas is a major challenge for diaspora-engaging institutions, Ethiopia’s
government holds that a central obstacle for contributions from its diasporans is a
“lack of accurate and up to date information about the country’s development
policies” (Ethiopian Government 2011: 5). Essentially, the lack of reliable data and
information exists for all actors, governments and expatriates alike. To address this
issue, the General Directorate for Diaspora Engagement Affairs within the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs works with its satellite offices, consulates, and other federal
ministries to identify and interact with diaspora groups in many countries. The
General Directorate has also published the document “Basic Information for
Ethiopians in the Diaspora” (2011) available on the Foreign Ministry website or in
person at the Ministry in Addis Ababa, regional Ministry offices, and consulates. This
document provides information on tax regulations, diaspora ID cards, foreign
currency accounts for both individuals and companies with Ethiopian-based banks,
investment incentives, available MTOs, and guidelines for the country’s second
diaspora bond project, the Grand Renaissance Dam Bond, which is marketed toward
expatriates as well as citizens at home.
Through conversations with representatives of the Ethiopian Foreign
Ministry and its offices in the summer of 2013, it seems they are hopeful that
making the basic information available will stimulate personal and commercial
investments from expatriates. A common point of pride concerning the Grand
Renaissance Dam Project is that it will be 100 percent funded by the Ethiopian
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people, at home and abroad. While diaspora groups in North America and Europe
hold fundraisers in support of the dam – in 2013, Ethiopians in Vancouver, Canada
raised over $100,000 – others refuse to invest in the project citing a corrupt and
continually undemocratic regime in Addis Ababa (Derassa and Mbuka 2013; Jemal
2013).
As the example of the Diaspora Affairs General Directorate in Ethiopia and its
efforts to involve expatriates in the dam project illustrate, the social construction of
a monolithic, united “diaspora” as a force for development at home should not
overshadow the reality of diverse needs, skills, and views held by a nation’s
expatriates. This observation supports Plaza’s (2009) finding that a lack of
knowledge about the diaspora is a major impediment to the success of government
diaspora-engaging institutions. The majority of these institutions, having only
recently come into existence, lack true capacity to affect change in governmentdiaspora coordination, and the list of measurable accomplishments is modest.
Inconsistencies brought about by regime alterations and a lack of intra-bureaucratic
coordination that often creates redundancies further hamper productivity in these
nascent institutions (see Chapter Two).
To this end, the African Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC) based in the
Netherlands has recently begun a series of capacity-building workshops for leaders
and staff of governmental diaspora institutions in Africa. In 2010 and 2011,
representatives from six countries attended the first and second workshops in
Accra: Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Rwanda (ADPC 2011). Planning
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for more workshops is underway. During the workshops, politicians and
bureaucrats were able to network and learn of examples of best practices such as
the Diaspora Corporate Bond (National Bank of Ethiopia), the Tax-Relief for Nonresident Indians Scheme, and the Matching Fund from Mexican HTAs supported by
the Mexican Government (ADPC 2011: 5). Also at the workshops, participants
indicated needs for received direct technical assistance in drafting national strategy
papers for migration and development that could be translated into policy.
Participants also noted the need for strengthening the capacity of regional bodies
such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in terms of
managing and documenting migration, and better overall documentation of past and
present efforts from African governments to mobilize their diasporas (ADPC 2011).
To date, many of these new institutions have been meeting with diaspora groups in
major destination countries to assess the capabilities, potential strategies, and needs
of the diaspora in prospective partnerships and mutual projects (Kenyan Embassy,
Washington DC 2011; Martin 2009: 9). High hopes are expressed for a developmentoriented linkage between African governments and their far-flung diasporic
communities as well as their productive emigrants on the continent. The
institutional fragilities of the new governmental ministries and offices represent
difficult but not impossible hurdles for development goals. Strengthening
associational linkages between diasporas and home governments represent a new
frontier in national (and possibly international) policies for development.
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SUMMARY
Over 30 million Africans have emigrated from their countries of origin,
moving within and beyond the continent’s sub-regions. Average remittances for
African countries in 2000 were below $20 million but reached $80 million by 2010.
Reported amounts received in 2010 ranged from just over $200,000 in Liberia to
almost $20 billion in Nigeria. Remittances are now larger than foreign aid to Africa
and represent a large portion of incoming transnational capital, and that is only
when measuring formally transferred flows. Lack of trust in public and private
banks, along with high costs and urban concentration of licensed MTOs reinforce
informal transfers through more traditional and diverse extra-familial hawala
networks. Remittances respond not only to exchange rate fluctuations, but to times
of high political importance, conflicts, and disasters.
African governments are recognizing the volume of remittances as well as
other resources from their diasporas and are beginning to formally institutionalize
relations with them (Aguinas 2009). The number of national level governmental
institutions of the diaspora has grown from a handful in 2000 to at least 36 in 2013,
ranging from offices under the president to fully dedicated ministries. Though the
tangible accomplishments of these nascent organizations are relatively few, many
have reached out to their diasporas in top destination countries and begun to work
with regional organizations to coordinate efforts in engaging diasporas for
development.
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Can these new governmental diaspora ministries and offices succeed in
utilizing the technical, financial, and social resources of their expatriates toward
development in home countries? How does the now $40 billion annually in
transnational remittance to Africa affect development processes and projects? Does
the relocation through migration of, in many cases, a country’s best and brightest
tend to slow processes of development? To shed light on these questions, the next
chapter describes development in Africa, and quantitatively models the relationship
between development, remittances, and governmental diaspora institutions over
the last two decades.
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NOTES: CHAPTER THREE

This of course, is not inclusive of involuntary migrants and one need only point to the millions of
Liberian, Somali, and Sudanese refugees of conflict to assert that migration is not always a choice and
needs little “motivation” than survival itself.
2 Côte d’Ivoire was for decades a net immigration country largely due to its thriving cocoa and
construction sectors, until a military coup in 1999 and the ensuing political violence and uncertainty.
Since 2000, Côte d’Ivoire has been a net emigration country, due mostly to political refugees and
others fleeing ethnic conflict. It remains, however, a top destination for emigrants from its neighbors
(Arthur 1991; CIA 2013; IOM 2009).
3 Ecobank serves the following African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo,
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
4 Countries and territories where M-Pesa has partnered with Western Union to offer mobile transfer
services are: American Samoa, Bahrain, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada,
Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Guam, Hong Kong,
Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali, Netherlands, Niger, Northern Mariana Islands,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tanzania, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Yemen, and
Zambia.
5 I estimated the number of Western Union and MoneyGram locations from the companies’ websites
and the searchable databases of available payout locations in each country.
6 The combined number of Western Union and MoneyGram outlets in African countries is correlated
with the annual remittance receipts with a Pearson’s r of 0.69. A bivariate regression of the number
of outlets on remittances produces an R-squared of 0.48 and predicts a five percent increase in the
number of outlets from a ten percent increase in remittances.
7 The official aims of the G8’s “5X5” objective are:
“a) fostering market transparency and consumer protection;
b) improving the payment systems infrastructure;
c) reforming the legal and regulatory framework;
d) enhancing market structure and competition;
e) adopting governance and risk management best practices” (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2009).
8 For the 24 countries that reported remittances in both 2000 and 2010, the median amount of
remittances grew fivefold from $22 million to $113 million during the decade.
9 All of these data regarding governmental institutions of the diaspora are the result of copious
searches of various country sources including constitutions, decrees, and country websites.
10 The ICMDP is the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (an international
organization created in 1993 by Austria and Switzerland (www.icmdp.org) and the IOM is the
International Organization for Migration and self-described “principal intergovernmental
organization in the field of migration” (www.iom.int).
1
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APPENDIX: CHAPTER THREE

TABLE A3.A CENTRAL AFRICA, TOP FIVE EMIGRATION DESTINATIONS, 2010
Country
Angola
Cameroon
CAR
Chad
Dem. Congo
Côte d'Ivoire
Eq. Guinea
Gabon
São T & P

Top Destination

Destination 2

Destination 3

Destination 4 Destination 5

Portugal

Zambia

Namibia

Other South

France

46% (245,650)

18% (93,496)

13% (67,540)

4% (22,868)

4% (18,906)

France

Chad

Gabon

US

Nigeria

24% (68,250)

17% (48,547)

12% (33,876)

10% (26,912)

9% (25,296)

Chad

France

Other South

Congo

Netherlands

69% (88,978)

11% (13,945)

9% (12,113)

8% (10,567)

1% (970)

Nigeria

Other South

Cameroon

Sudan

CAR

29% (71,134)

23% (56,660)

17% (40,683)

Rwanda

Uganda

Congo

Belgium

Other South

41% (372,964)

9% (85,476)

9% (78,458)

8% (76,870)

8% (75,875)

Burkina Faso

Other South

Mali

France

Italy

72% (842,931)

10% (113,393)

7% (77,549)

6% (71,334)

2% (22,276)

Gabon

Spain

Other South

Nigeria

Congo

61% (62,711)

24% (24,829)

8% (8,298)

5% (4,772)

1% (531)

France

Mali

Other South

Congo

US

58% (14,615)

19% (4,748)

3% (790)

3% (649)

2% (600)

Portugal

Angola

Cape Verde

Other South

Spain

11% (27,442) 10% (24,209)

49% (17,612)
32% (11,532)
11% (4,061)
5% (1,889)
1% (248)
World Bank Estimates. Percentage is percent of total migrants, number of migrants in parentheses;
African destination countries bolded. “Other South” refers to unspecified destinations in Global South.
Source: World Bank 2013a
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TABLE A3.B EASTERN AFRICA, TOP FIVE EMIGRATION DESTINATIONS, 2010
Country
Burundi
Comoros
Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritius
Mozambique
Rwanda
Seychelles
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Top Destination Destination 2
Tanzania
Uganda
42% (151,313) 29% (101,826)

Destination 3
Rwanda
13% (44,785)

Destination 4

Destination 5

Other South
10% (36,071)

Belgium
1% (4,991)

France

Madagascar

Tanzania

Egypt

Other South

70% (26,951)

17% (6,692)

4% (1,671)

4% (1,491)

3% (1,195)

France

Ethiopia

Canada

Other South

Egypt

48% (6,489)

28% (3,768)

5% (630)

4% (527)

4% (494)

Sudan

Ethiopia

Other South

Saudi Arabia

Italy

49% (458,042) 31% (290,383)

10% (90,688)

4% (40,644)

2% (14,805)

US

Israel

Djibouti

Kenya

25% (152,094) 23% (139,693)

5% (30,763)

Sudan

14% (87,556)

6% (34,697)

Tanzania

US

Uganda

Canada

33% (152,999) 20% (91,146)

19% (85,123)

9% (41,065)

6% (26,164)

UK

Comoros

Canada

Belgium

US

69% (54,841) 13% (10,401)

France

3% (2,363)

2% (1,608)

2% (1,496)

Tanzania

UK

Other South

South Africa

46% (98,270) 10% (21,042)

Zimbabwe

10% (20,816)

9% (20,158)

8% (17,955)

France

Australia

Italy

Canada

30% (41,632) 28% (39,958)

UK

16% (22,914)

9% (12,022)

8% (11,240)

Zimbabwe

Tanzania

Other South

South Africa

Malawi

39% (454,548) 14% (159,945) 13% (158,722) 12% (142,615) 10% (113,721)
Uganda

Tanzania

Burundi

Other South

Belgium

47% (123,860) 19% (49,536)

13% (33,540)

10% (25,060)

4% (11,498)

UK

Australia

Canada

Italy

US

31% (3,848)

26% (3,153)

8% (1,030)

7% (850)

7% (841)

Ethiopia

UK

US

Yemen

Djibouti

20% (161,179) 14% (110,326) 13% (109,618)

10% (79,466)

7% (57,246)

Yemen

Kenya

Other South

29% (279,409) 20% (191,103) 13% (126,109)

Saudi Arabia

8% (73,076)

6% (56,913)

Kenya

Uganda
Uganda

UK

Other South

Canada

29% (92,527) 23% (71,833)

11% (34,347)

8% (25,510)

7% (23,009)

Kenya

Other South

UK

Tanzania

US

70% (531,218)

9% (70,733)

7% (54,122)

4% (30,110)

3% (22,460)

Tanzania

UK

Zimbabwe

Malawi

Other Source

23% (42,311) 18% (33,306)

15% (28,274)

12% (23,192)

7% (13,940)

Other South

Mozambique

Australia

South Africa

UK

68% (858,993) 9% (115,530) 9% (114,968)
4% (49,280)
2% (25,963)
World Bank Estimates. Percentage is percent of total migrants, number of migrants in parentheses;
African destination countries bolded. “Other South” refers to unspecified destinations in Global
South.
Source: World Bank 2013a
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TABLE A3.C NORTHERN AFRICA, TOP FIVE EMIGRATION DESTINATIONS, 2010
Country
Algeria
Egypt
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia

Top Destination Destination 2

Destination 3

Destination 4

Destination 5

France

Spain

Israel

Canada

Italy

75% (913,794)

5% (63,346)

4% (47,199)

3% (37,543)

2% (29,480)

Saudi Arabia

Jordan

Libya

Kuwait

Other South

27% (1,005,873) 23% (851,803) 11% (397,064) 9% (319,483)

5% (176,077)

Israel

UK

26% (28,541) 11% (12,108)
France

US

Jordan

10% (11,105) 10% (10,754)

7% (8,011)

Israel

Belgium

28% (840,985) 26% (778,451) 16% (475,783) 8% (245,574)

6% (172,682)

France

Spain

Chad

Italy

Italy
Libya

Germany

Israel

46% (302,363) 19% (121,708) 13% (84,585) 6% (37,049)
2% (14,789)
World Bank Estimates. Percentage is percent of total migrants, number of migrants in parentheses;
African destination countries bolded. “Other South” refers to unspecified destinations in Global
South.
Source: World Bank 2013a

TABLE A3.D SOUTHERN AFRICA, TOP FIVE EMIGRATION DESTINATIONS, 2010
Country
Botswana
Lesotho
Namibia
South Africa

Top Destination Destination 2

Destination 3

Destination 4

Destination 5

South Africa

Other South

Zimbabwe

Namibia

UK

66% (41,846)

10% (6,006)

7% (4,244)

4% (2,741)

4% (2,717)

South Africa

Other South

Mozambique

Tanzania

UK

82% (350,657) 11% (46,016)

7% (28,799)

0% (649)

0% (438)

Mozambique

Tanzania

UK

US

Other South

42% (6,909)

11% (1,891)

10% (1,629)

7% (1,205)

7% (1,099)

UK Mozambique

Australia

US

Canada

26% (225,856) 18% (154,579) 15% (132,756)

9% (81,142)

5% (47,470)

South Africa
Other South Mozambique
UK
US
Swaziland
85% (135,720) 11% (16,974)
3% (4,118)
1% (1,143)
0% (766)
World Bank Estimates. Percentage is percent of total migrants, number of migrants in parentheses;
African destination countries bolded. “Other South” refers to unspecified destinations in Global
South.
Source: World Bank 2013a
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TABLE A3.E WESTERN AFRICA, TOP FIVE EMIGRATION DESTINATIONS, 2010
Country
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde
Congo
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo

Top Destination Destination 2
Nigeria

Destination 3

Destination 4

Destination 5

Togo

Côte d'Ivoire

Other South

Gabon

45% (238,561) 14% (74,336)

12% (62,371)

10% (54,669)

6% (32,173)

Other South

Niger

Mali

Italy

83% (1,310,892) 11% (167,834)

Côte d'Ivoire

2% (29,881)

1% (22,365)

1% (11,651)

France

US

Mozambique

Angola

33% (63,403) 12% (23,197)

Portugal

11% (20,855)

11% (20,702)

7% (13,219)

France

Gabon

Other South

US

31% (64,849) 30% (63,423)

3% (6,150)

Tanzania

7% (14,913)

5% (11,242)

Spain

US

Nigeria

Senegal

UK

28% (18,112)

12% (7,472)

10% (6,509)

9% (5,881)

8% (5,198)

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

US

23% (186,015) 13% (111,001) 13% (110,931)
Côte d'Ivoire

UK Burkina Faso
12% (96,795)

6% (50,217)

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Gambia

Other South

25% (134,171) 15% (80,773)

13% (69,127)

11% (58,625)

10% (51,552)

Senegal

Gambia

France

Spain

27% (30,225) 22% (24,155)

Portugal

18% (20,158)

8% (8,653)

7% (7,462)

Côte d'Ivoire

US

Other South

Sierra Leone

44% (189,437) 17% (74,734)

Guinea

15% (66,652)

9% (37,453)

6% (24,887)

Nigeria

Other South

Niger

France

43% (440,960) 13% (133,464)

Côte d'Ivoire

10% (98,799)

7% (69,790)

7% (68,786)

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

France

Spain

25% (29,600) 15% (17,960)

9% (10,888)

Senegal

13% (15,604)

12% (14,481)

Côte d'Ivoire

Benin

Other South

Chad

23% (87,529) 22% (84,705)

21% (80,789)

11% (40,831)

10% (38,468)

Nigeria

Chad

Cameroon

Italy

21% (210,647) 15% (150,918) 11% (114,025)

US

8% (78,292)

5% (52,845)

Gambia

UK
France

Italy

Mauritania

Spain

28% (177,306) 14% (91,446)

13% (81,424)

10% (64,557)

8% (51,672)

Guinea

UK

Other South

US

Liberia

59% (157,067)

9% (22,898)

8% (21,659)

7% (17,549)

5% (12,086)

Nigeria

Côte d'Ivoire

Benin

Other South Burkina Faso

31% (115,791) 15% (56,527) 14% (51,302)
9% (33,991)
7% (23,993)
World Bank Estimates. Percentage is percent of total migrants, number of migrants in parentheses;
African destination countries bolded. “Other South” refers to unspecified destinations in Global South.
Source: World Bank 2013a
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TABLE A3.F WESTERN UNION AND MONEYGRAM OUTLETS, 2013
COUNTRY
WESTERN UNION
MONEYGRAM
ALGERIA
780
88
ANGOLA
295
324
BENIN
701
147
BOTSWANA
111
20
BURKINA FASO
550
261
BURUNDI
25
5
CAMEROON
1054
6
CAPE VERDE
110
35
C.A.R.
37
32
CHAD
16
36
COMOROS
50
23
CONGO
52
63
COTE D'IVOIRE
925
423
D.R.C.
180
129
DJIBOUTI
16
2
EGYPT
199
201
EQ. GUINEA
12
0
ERITREA
14
8
ETHIOPIA
1648
1560
GABON
115
36
GAMBIA
437
209
GHANA
1825
1579
GUINEA
63
87
GUINEA-BISSAU
35
12
KENYA
1367
1007
LESOTHO
2
10
LIBERIA
108
88
LIBYA
321
121
MADAGASCAR
195
45
MALAWI
124
299
MALI
300
363
MAURITANIA
128
22
MAURITIUS
44
89
MOROCCO
7063
5714
MOZAMBIQUE
90
28
NAMIBIA
4
25
NIGER
80
25
NIGERIA
5033
3702
RWANDA
304
105
SAO T. & P.
8
4
SENEGAL
1600
1300
SEYCHELLES
4
7
SIERRA LEONE
97
97
SOMALIA
4
0
SOUTH AFRICA
639
975
SOUTH SUDAN
25
4
SUDAN
59
0
SWAZILAND
1
8
TANZANIA
303
62
TOGO
403
216
TUNISIA
1810
525
UGANDA
500
322
WESTERN SAHARA
27
40
ZAMBIA
261
138
ZIMBABWE
268
77
TOTALS
30,422
20,704
Sources: MoneyGram 2013; Western Union 2013.

TOTAL
868
619
848
131
811
30
1060
1008
69
52
73
115
1348
309
18
400
12
22
3208
151
646
3404
150
47
2374
12
196
442
240
423
663
150
133
12777
118
29
105
8735
409
12
2900
11
194
4
1614
29
59
9
365
619
2335
822
67
399
345
51,989
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TABLE A3.G REMITTANCES, 2010 (REPORTING COUNTRIES ONLY)
Country
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso*
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Côte d’Ivoire
Djibouti
Egypt
Ethiopia
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Malawi
Mali
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger*
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
*Value from 2009

Remittance
$66,000,000
$17,972,037
$127,108,663
$12,149,366
$84,004,980
$34,498,930
$93,622,353
$130,420,622
$191,594,762
$6,577,726
$12,453,100,000
$345,150,775
$107,314,553
$135,852,160
$44,840,000
$43,910,779
$685,757,272
$6,040,879
$213,908
$15,926,805
$437,433,983
$6,422,542,514
$33,415,350
$6,017,279
$60,334,238
$19,650,650,848
$98,207,379
$6,363,257
$1,384,122,360
$16,488,951
$41,568,561
$1,290,912,517
$1,871,272
$42,794,934
$300,979,035
$1,724,814,867
$768,000,000
$43,700,000

Remittance (% of GNI)
0.0%
0.0%
2.0%
0.1%
1.0%
2.3%
0.4%
8.4%
0.8%
0.5%
5.7%
1.3%
11.4%
0.4%
1.2%
5.4%
2.1%
0.2%
0.0%
0.3%
4.8%
6.9%
0.4%
0.1%
1.1%
10.9%
1.8%
3.0%
11.0%
1.8%
2.1%
1.7%
0.0%
0.2%
9.5%
4.1%
4.6%
0.3%

Source: World Bank 2011.
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TABLE A3.H GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE DIASPORA, 2013
Country

Year

Type

Institution Title

Algeria

2002

Subministry

State Secretary of the National Community Living Abroad

Angola

1992

Subministry

The Institute Providing Support to Angolan Communities Abroad

Benin

2009

Subministry

The Subagency of the Directorate for Relations with Beninese Abroad

Burkina Faso

2007

Subministry

High Council of Burkinabe Abroad

Burundi

2009

Subministry

Directorate of the Diaspora

Cameroon

2005

Subministry

Division for Cameroonians Abroad

Cape Verde

2001

Ministry

Min. of Emigrant Communities‡

Comoros

2005

Shared Ministry

Min. of Foreign Relations, Cooperation, and Comorians Abroad

Côte d’Ivoire

2001

Subministry

Department of Ivoirians Abroad

Dem. Congo

2006

Subministry

Directorate of Congolese Nationals Abroad

Eq. Guinea

2013

Subministry

Directorate of the Diaspora

Eritrea

2002

Subministry

Department of Eritreans Abroad‡

Ethiopia

2002

Subministry

General Directorate in charge of Expatriate Affairs

Gambia

2010

Shared Ministry

Min. of Foreign Affairs, Int’l Cooperation, and Gambians Abroad

Ghana

2006

Shared Ministry

Min. of Tourism and Diaspora Relations

Guinea

2009

Ministry

Min. of Guineans Abroad

Guinea-Bissau

2006

Shared Ministry

Min. of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and the Diaspora

Kenya

2007

Subministry

International Jobs and Diaspora Office

Malawi

2011

Other Office

Diaspora Affairs Unit

Mali

2000

Shared Ministry

Min. of Malians Abroad and African Integration

Mauritania

2008

Ministry

State Secretariat of Mauritanians Abroad

Morocco

1990

Ministry

Min. in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad

Mozambique

2009

Subministry

National Institute for Mozambican Communities Abroad

Niger

2009

Shared Ministry

Min. of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, African Integration, Nigeriens Abroad

Nigeria

2001

Subministry

Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization

Rwanda

2001

Subministry

Diaspora General Directorate

Sao T & P

2005

Shared Ministry

Min. of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation & Communities

Senegal

2003

Ministry

Min. of Senegalese Abroad

Sierra Leone

2007

Other Office

Office of the Diaspora

Somalia

2009

Shared Ministry

Min. for Diaspora and Community Affairs

South Sudan

2011

Subministry

Liaison Offices and Diaspora

Tanzania

2010

Subministry

Diaspora Engagement and Opportunities Department

Togo

2011

Subministry

Department of Togolese Abroad

Tunisia

1988

Shared Ministry

Min. of Social Affairs, Solidarity and Tunisians Abroad‡

Uganda

2010

Subministry

Diaspora Services Department

Zambia
2009 Other Office
Diaspora Desk
Notes: All subministries are located within countries’ foreign affairs ministries; All “other offices” are housed directly or
indirectly under the office of the president.
‡ Cape Verde previously established a subministry in 2001, replaced by the full ministry in 2010; The Department of Eritreans
Abroad was called the Commission for Eritreans Residing Abroad from 2002 – 2007; Tunisia created the Office of Tunisians
Abroad in the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1988, and renamed the Ministry in 2005.
Sources: Various electronic country sources.
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CHAPTER FOUR
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
The continent of Africa is home to the largest concentration of developing
countries in the world. Of the 49 countries the UN classifies as “least developed”,
two-thirds (34) of them are located in Africa1, including the UN’s newest member,
South Sudan (UN-OHRLLS 2011). The least developed countries (LDCs) are
classified as such according to their low incomes but also for a lack of economic
stability and diversity as well as a number of other factors: poor education and
health rates, and a lack of food and environmental security relative to other
countries. In contrast to the 34 LDCs there, other African states have made
development strides over the last few decades, including South Africa, Botswana,
Ghana, the island nations of the Seychelles and Mauritius, and the five Northern
African countries bordering the Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and
Tunisia). This chapter examines the impacts of transnational remittances and the
institutionalization of diaspora engagement on development in Africa through
quantitative analysis.
The following section describes and compares three development indicators
across Africa - education, health, and income – both regionally and nationally, and
explains the calculation of a development index (much like the Human Development
Index (HDI) from the UNDP), for use as the dependent variable. Section Three
describes the other variables as well as the methodological approach for the
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analysis in Section Four. To investigate the connections between both transnational
remittances and new governmental institutions of the diaspora with development in
Africa, I quantitatively model the relationships using panel regression. Using
available data, 43 of the 53 (now 54) countries are in the model that considers
development from 1990 through 2010. The final section summarizes.

DEVELOPMENT
It has been conventional for many scholars and international organizations
to separate Africa into two main regions: North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. North
African states are generally grouped with the developing states in the Middle East
(the MENA region). Generally, the five states of the Afro-Mediterranean surpass the
much larger group of 48 (now 49) sub-Saharan states on many development
indicators and have for decades. Yet southern states like South Africa and Namibia
along with the island states of Mauritius and Seychelles outperform the non-petrol
states of Central and West Africa. Figure 4.1 compares the two regions across three
common development indicators from 1980 through 2010. As a measure of income,
I use gross national product per capita, purchasing power parity (GNPppp) from the
Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012).2 With a GNPppp per capita
of just under $7000 in 2010, North Africa median income is five times that of subSaharan Africa (just under $1400). Indeed, sub-Saharan income for 2010 is roughly
equal to that of North Africa 30 years earlier in 1980. The same trend exists with
respect to average expected education and longevity. At nine years in 2010, the
median expected years of schooling for sub-Saharan children has been growing at
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slower rates and is approximately equal to that from 25 years ago in North Africa.
Life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa (55 years in 2010) is among the lowest in the
world and has yet to reach 59 years, the median life expectancy in North African in
1980.
FIGURE 4.1 REGIONAL COMPARISONS: NORTH AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The differences between Northern Africa and “the rest” are much less stark
when the sub-Saharan regions are considered separately as Central, Eastern,
Southern, and Western Africa. Figure 4.2 compares Africa’s five regions on the same
indicators as above. Median Southern African income has paralleled that of
Northern Africa for the last 30 years and was slightly higher for most of the 1990s.
Contributing mostly to this trend are the diamond industry in Botswana and overall
growth in South Africa, one of the five “BRICS” countries commonly identified as the
world’s most promising emerging economies.3 Increasing oil revenues in Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, and Angola since the 1990s have slightly set Central African income
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apart from the two poorest regions, East and West Africa. However, these two
regions, along with North Africa have most steadily grown education rates since the
1990s. North Africans have maintained much longer life expectancies – 10 or more
years on average – than most of their southern counterparts. Though Southern
African life expectancy paralleled that of Northern Africa before the 1990s, the
disproportionate impact of HIV/Aids in Southern Africa – where prevalence rates
remain the highest in the world – played a major role in lowering life expectancies
throughout the 1990s until around 2005 when they leveled off at 50 years and
began to increase. A more coherent analysis of African development is possible
when all the regions are surveyed. In focusing on the development impacts of
remittances and of institutionalizing diaspora engagement, I include countries from
all of Africa’s five regions.
FIGURE 4.2 REGIONAL COMPARISON: AFRICA’S FIVE REGIONS4
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Just as disaggregating sub-Saharan Africa into geo-economic regions
illuminates more diversity across the four regions and some similarities to Northern
Africa, inspecting the development indicators by country exposes even more
diversity and allows further comparison. The first component of the development
index is education. Education is a crucial asset in driving development as it
increases citizens’ capabilities and expands socioeconomic opportunities. Figure 4.3
shows the expected years of schooling by country from 1980 through 2010. For
comparison, and to provide examples of countries at various stages of development,
I have included three other countries: Brazil, France, and Haiti. The three represent
a BRICS country, an OECD country, and an LDC.
As Figure 4.3 indicates, the average expected years of schooling in Africa as a
whole increased from six to nine years from 1980 to 2010. Many of the 53 countries
included here have made at least modest improvements in children’s education
rates.5 By 2010, the countries of North Africa along with Botswana, South Africa, and
the small island states of Mauritius and the Seychelles were on par with Brazil and
France at well over 10 years of expected schooling. On the other hand, for example,
a decade of intermittent civil war in Congo in the 1990s saw expected schooling fall
from 13 years in 1980 to eight years in 2000. Still many states, especially in East
Africa, have education rates below those in Haiti, the poorest country in the Western
Hemisphere.
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FIGURE 4.3 EXPECTED YEARS OF SCHOOLING FOR CHILDREN, 1980 – 2010

The second component of the development index is life expectancy at birth,
an indicator of the overall health of a state’s citizenry. Like education, good health is
important for development in that it expands peoples’ capabilities. Higher life
expectancies also generally reflect competent public health sectors and citizens’
increased knowledge of health risks. Figure 4.4 shows life expectancies by country.
Average life expectancy for Africans has grown from 50 years in 1980 to 57 years in
2010 and most individual countries have seen increases of five or more years. In
2010, life expectancies ranged from 47 to 75 years in Sierra Leone and Libya
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respectively. Wars and other political violence have held down or decreased life
expectancies in, for example, Congo, Liberia, and Rwanda. As noted above, the AIDS
crisis beginning in the late 1980s has been one significant factor in decreasing life
expectancies, especially in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. In 2010,
17 countries including Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone had life
expectancies more than 10 years less than that of Haiti, 62 years. In the same year,
eight countries had life expectancies equal to or slightly higher than Brazil at 73
years, including Cape Verde, Morocco, and Tunisia.
FIGURE 4.4 LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, 1980 – 2010
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The final component of the development index is per capita income.
Increases to income are important for development in that they expand citizens’
capabilities, opportunities, and choices. Table 4.A shows the 10 largest and 10
smallest per capita incomes in Africa (Table A4.B in the chapter’s appendix shows
the full list of countries and their incomes). Measured in the same international
dollar, two states’ per capita incomes were lower in 2010 than in 1980: Liberia and
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The latter is the poorest country on the
continent, and in 2010 its income of $263 was less than one percent of the highest,
Seychelles, and just over one percent of the second highest income, Libya.
TABLE 4.A HIGHEST AND LOWEST INCOME COUNTRIES PER CAPITA, 1980 – 2010
10 Highest-Income
Seychelles
Libya
Gabon
Mauritius
Botswana
South Africa
Equatorial Guinea
Tunisia
Algeria
Namibia
10 Lowest-Income
Madagascar
Malawi
Eritrea
Central African Republic
Niger
Somalia
Burundi
Liberia
Zimbabwe
Democratic Congo

GNPppp pc
1980
2010
$6,265 $32,322
$9,641* $20,227
$7,130 $13,005
$1,482 $10,515
$1,484 $10,285
$3,016
$8,730
$376
$7,165
$1,825
$7,147
$2,694
$6,933
$1,984
$5,831
$534
$369
$602*
$329
$428
$311
$253
$656
$195
$302

Average Annual Growth
1980s
1990s
2000s
8%
5%
5%
-4%
2%
9%
1%
0%
8%
11%
6%
4%
13%
5%
4%
2%
3%
6%
-2%
32%
17%
4%
4%
6%
2%
2%
6%
4%
2%
6%

$807
$791
$699
$674
$549
$487
$452
$404
$359
$263

1%
1%
n/a
4%
0%
4%
5%
-6%
5%
0%

1%
1%
3%
2%
0%
-2%
-2%
10%
-1%
-5%

2%
7%
0%
3%
2%
3%
3%
0%
3%
5%

*First column data for Libya and Eritrea are from 1985 and 1992 respectively

Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012 (Penn World Tables)
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Focusing on the top income countries, revenues from extensive oil reserves
drive income upward in Libya, Algeria, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea while
Botswana is the world’s largest diamond producer (BBC 2012). The Seychelles
relies on tourism for one-quarter of its income and 70 percent of its foreign
exchange earnings (World Bank 2012). Tourism, along with an expansive
international banking sector, also drives much economic success in Mauritius. Less
dependent on one commodity or sector, Tunisia, South Africa, and Namibia (whose
economy remains closely linked to South Africa’s) have relatively more diversified
economies with large manufacturing, retail, and finance sectors (African Economic
Outlook 2013). Most of these countries have enjoyed more than adequate growth
rates over the last three decades: the economy of the Seychelles is now over five
times as large as it was in 1980 and that of Equatorial Guinea, thanks to the
expansion of its oil infrastructure and exports throughout the 1990s, is now over 19
times larger than in 1980. However, this accelerated growth has not come without
costs: rising inflation, corruption, and inequality (World Bank 2013b; Transparency
International 2012). Furthermore, education rates in Equatorial Guinea have fallen
since 1990 (Figure 4.3).
Most of the lower income countries on the continent have clearly not
experienced sustained economic growth over the last few decades, though many
have experienced political instability along with prolonged or episodic violence.
This is not to say that higher income countries have been immune from violence and
political instability: for example, after a military coup that halted elections in 1991,
oil-rich Algeria spent a decade in civil war with 150,000 casualties (Uppsala Conflict
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Data Program 2011; BBC 2013). In 2010, Chad ranked twenty-sixth and Sudan
eighteenth in income out of the 53 African states and ranked third and second
respectively out of 168 states on the Failed States Index (FSI) (Table A4.B; Fund for
Peace 2013). The FSI combines social, economic, and political indicators to measure
the ability of governments to provide public goods and hold a legitimate monopoly
over the use of violence. Higher ranks indicate less ability or inability to do so. In the
same year, the first, fourth, and fifth states on the FSI were Somalia, Zimbabwe, and
Democratic Congo, three of Africa’s poorest countries. Revenues from and foreign
investment in oil reserves set Chad and Sudan apart from the lowest income
countries economically, yet both of these countries score low on most social
indicators, including education and health (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). Examples such as
these signify the necessity of measuring development through multiple indicators
rather than solely using income.
Accordingly, I construct an index which factors in education, health, and
income similar to the HDI used by the UNDP. The UNDP’s HDI has three sub-indices.
The first of these is the education index, which uses the expected years of schooling
for children along with the mean actual years of schooling for adults. The health
index uses life expectancy at birth and the income index uses GNIppp per capita.
Due to a lack of available data for many African country-years for the mean years of
schooling for adults and GNIppp per capita, I use only the expected years of
schooling for children to build the education index, and GNPppp per capita for the
income index.6 In the end, for the country-years for which both are available, my
index is correlated with actual HDI at 0.972.
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Creating the development index consists of two steps: calculating each subindex and compiling the final values. The sub-indices are normalized by benchmark
minimum and maximum values observed or set by the UNDP for their respective
indicators to obtain relative values for each category. For example, the difference in
life expectancy for country i and the minimum benchmark life expectancy (20 years)
is divided by the global range of life expectancy (83.2 years from Japan, 2010 minus
the 20 year minimum) to produce the health index (Equation 1). After each subindex is obtained, they are combined by finding the geometric mean of all three
(Equation 2). Following the UNDP when measuring income, the natural logarithm of
income is used rather than the actual value (UNDP 2010). The extreme values for
each sub-index are shown in Table A4.C.

Figure 4.5 shows the development rankings of countries in 2010 (Figure A4.1
in the appendix shows all years). Values span practically the entire range of the
index from the war-torn societies of Somalia and Democratic Congo to the better-off
states of the Seychelles and Libya. Using this index, the four most developed African
countries (Libya, Seychelles, Mauritius, and Tunisia) fall between France and Brazil.
About half of the countries in Africa fall below Haiti, which is consistent with the
HDI from the UNDP.
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FIGURE 4.5 DEVELOPMENT INDEX, 2010

Development in Africa is diverse. What Figure 4.5 and the development index
in general show is that national development – in terms of increasing citizens’ social
and economic capacities and opportunities – is multi-faceted and larger than income
alone. While the top 10 to 15 African countries in Figure 4.5 have made
development strides across all three indicators – health, education, and income – the
remainder continue to struggle to improve on one or more of the key development
aspects. For example Madagascar, though vulnerable to environmental shocks and
political instability which repeatedly render its economy stagnant and growth
fragile, made progress in providing education and health care in the 2000s. In
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contrast, Zambia enjoyed 10 percent average annual economic growth throughout
the 2000s (Table A4.B), and while expected years of schooling for Zambian children
was an admirable eight years in 2010, this figure had not increased in 30 years and
remained below the continental average (Figure 4.3). Life expectancy in Zambia –
like most Southern African nations – plummeted in the 1990s due to the AIDS crisis
and was still below 50 years in 2010 (Figure 4.4). As these two examples suggest –
and though economic growth can have a positive impact on education and health
rates – increases to income are neither a necessary nor sufficient circumstance for
improving the social condition.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Rather than to isolate one or another aspect of development, I use the
development index as the outcome in the hypotheses herein tests for more holistic
development impacts from transnational remittances and government diaspora
institutions. As explained in Chapter One, I test two main hypotheses. Hypothesis
One states that as the ratio of remittances to gross national income increases to a
critical value, states will experience higher growth rates in human development;
after the critical value, states will experience lower growth rates in human
development. I purposefully employ the quadratic form of remittances (as a ratio to
GNI). I expect that small amounts of remittances in relation to income will be
healthy for development, while states that receive a more sizeable percentage of
income from remittances will be prone to suffering from brain-drain or the loss of
relatively large portions of the potential labor force. Thus, any potentially positive
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effects of small amounts of remittances with respect to income will be reversed as
remittances garner a larger percentage of income. Hypothesis Two holds that states
with a national-level formal institution of the diaspora will experience higher
growth rates in human development. The second hypothesis posits a positive
relationship, holding that if governments at least attempt to engage members of the
diaspora they may be inspired to contribute not just with economic but also social
and intellectual remittances, or to join hometown associations with other diasporic
members.
I model these relationships with a variation of two-stage least squares fixed
effects regression of a panel dataset with five waves of five-year averages from 1990
through 2010 on 43 African countries for which data are available for at least two
time periods (countries included are listed in the appendix, Table A4.D). There
exists the potential for endogeneity and reverse causality between remittances and
development, that is to say that more developed countries will receive more
remittances since their emigrants are on average more educated and skilled than
those from less developed countries. Following a method endorsed by the IMF
(Barajas et al. 2009; Chami et al. 2009; Chami et al. 2008), I use instrumental
variable techniques to predict remittances for each individual year reported and
then use the average of the fitted values as the average remittance in a final
regression, employing the ratio of remittances to income in all other (remittancereporting) African countries as the instrumental variable.7 To explain, for country i
in year t, I divide the total remittances to all other African countries by the total of
GNI to all those countries in year t. This gives the ratio of the rest of African
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remittance reporting countries to use on the right-hand side of a two-way fixed
effects regression from 1985 to 2009. Then I use the average of each five year
period fitted values (1985-1989,…, 2005-2009) in the final equation.
The requirements of a valid instrumental variable are (1) that it be highly
correlated with the endogenous regressor and (2) that it not be correlated with the
dependent variable and only affect the dependent variable through its effects on the
endogenous regressor (Wooldridge 2002). Remittance trends to other African
countries capture some of the transaction costs for emigrants associated with
remitting as well as decisions about whether and how much to remit. By omitting
the country in question from the construction of the instrumental variable, the
instrument remains exogenous and can only be related to development in that
country through its impact on levels of remittance.
I extend the same method for aid (official development assistance) used as a
control variable, since aid is also endogenous to development: less developed
countries should in theory get more aid and more developed countries less. The
rationale for using aid to all other aid-receiving African countries (as a ratio to GNI)
is to capture donor behavior and tendencies with respect to fluctuations in total
donor budget allotments for African aid in a given year. Again here, aid dollars to
other African countries can only impact development in the country in question
through their impact on aid to that country (due to donor preferences, etc). The tscores for REMREST OF AFRICA and AID REST OF AFRICA in the first-stage regressions are -
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10.35 and -24.98 respectively, both of which are adequately large to support their
validity (Schmidheiny 2012) (results in appendix, Table A4.E).
Next, for the dependent variable in the final equation, I use a deviation-fromfit measure. Much like income, where one would expect richer countries to grow
more slowly or increase less annually than poorer economies, countries whose
development index is relatively low have further to grow than those toward the top
of the scale. The UNDP often uses deviation-from-fit to measure the progress of
developing countries (Gidwitz et al. 2010; Klugman et al. 2011; Molina and Purser
2010). To get the deviation-from-fit, I regress the change in the index on its initial
value using the natural logarithms of each in a fixed effects regression. The residuals
of this growth model are the differences (like in any regression) of the actual and
expected values of the change (dependent variable) given the starting point (results
in appendix, Table A4.E). I use the residuals from this equation as a measure of
relative development: it is relative to a) its starting point five years ago and b) to
other countries starting at similar values. This accounts for the relative gains one
would expect and does not punish more developed countries for smaller changes. It
also helps avoid multicollinearity issues in the alternative, where including a lagged
value of the index on the right-hand side of the final equation is correlated with
control variables.
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FIGURE 4.6 DEVIATION-FROM-FIT RESULTS

Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of the deviation-from-fit measure by time
period in a series of box plots. Box plots are useful to display distributions since they
give viewers a sense of the dispersion and identify outlying values. In each of the
five box plots in Figure 4.6, the bold horizontal lines inside the boxes represent the
median values for each time period, the boxes encompass the first through third
quartiles, the whiskers denote relatively extreme values, and individual points
identify outliers. For the deviation-from-fit measure of development, while most
country-years are centered around zero – indicating relatively small residuals – the
outlying values can mostly be traced back to various periods of drastic policy
changes or political instability for the countries shown. For instance, after allegedly
fraudulent elections and a subsequent military coup in Nigeria in 1983-4, incomes
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wavered and education rates dropped from an expected 8.5 to 6.5 years of schooling
for children, driving down its development index (Banks, Miller, and Overstreet
2007: 679-680). The introduction of free primary education (FPE) in Malawi in
1994 saw an increase of one million pupils in 1995 and more than doubled the
expected years of schooling from five to over 10, and Burundi saw similar results
after introducing FPE in 2005 (Chimombo 2005; UNDP 2011). The 1994 genocide in
Rwanda saw all the components of its development index plummet from 1990 to
1995 and then quickly recuperate by 2000. Government and economic reforms in
Ethiopia over the last decade have resulted in increases to all its development index
components, most markedly from 2005 to 2010 (World Bank 2013). Finally, HIV
prevalence in Lesotho surged upward 71 percent from 1995 to 2000 (from 14 to 25
percent) and life expectancy fell from 57 to 48 years during that period (UNAIDS
2012; UNDP 2011).
Using this deviation-from-fit measure as the dependent variable, the
quantitative model contains six control variables that may affect development.
Expectations are that two of these, war/violent conflict and HIV prevalence, will
have negative impacts on development. Aid, Freedom House rating, the political
constraints index, and increasing economic openness will most likely show positive
influences.
First, to test the impacts of democratization on development, I use the
Freedom House ratings. Freedom House indexes are created from expert surveys for
all the world’s countries and rates each country as free, partially free, or not free in
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terms of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2011). Of the 53 African
countries, over half (55 percent) were rated as not free in 1990, while in 2010 less
than half (40 percent) received this rating (Figure 4.7). The number of full
democracies (rated “free”) rose from four (Botswana, The Gambia, Mauritius, and
Namibia) to eleven from 1990 to 2005 but then fell to nine by 2010, after Senegal
and Lesotho moved from “free” to “partially free”. In Senegal, allegedly rigged 2007
presidential elections and President Abdoulaye Wade’s subsequent postponement
of many municipal and national legislative elections – which 12 parties eventually
boycotted – saw its rating drop. In Lesotho, executive, legislative, and municipal
election results were heavily disputed between 2006 and 2009. The opposition
party supporters’ taking of hostages at the Independent Electoral Commission and
an assassination attempt of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili led to a lowering of
the country’s former rating as a “free” democracy (Freedom House 2011).
FIGURE 4.7 FREEDOM HOUSE SCORES FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES
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Second, as an indicator of the political economy climate, I use the Political
Constraints Index III (Henisz 2013 [2000]). The expectation is that healthier
political economies will experience greater development, since more constraints
indicate a healthier political economy. This index measures the feasibility of policy
change according to the distribution of veto power among branches of government,
cross-branch party alignment as well as legislative fractionalization. The index
theoretically goes from zero to one with higher values indicating less feasibility of
policy change on the part of a single or a few actors. While it measures political
checks and balances, economists often use it as a gauge of likelihood of investment
in infrastructure or the overall health of the political economy. These scores in
Figure 4.8 represent the average score for the five previous years by country. Over
the last two decades, the median value of this index in Africa moved from zero to
0.23. For reference, the highest scoring country in 2010 was Belgium (0.71) and the
US scored 0.40 in 2010 (Henisz 2013 [2000]).
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FIGURE 4.8 POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Third, as shown in the previous chapter, war and other types of political
violence can halt or reverse development trajectories. I control for war and/or other
political violence using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program database (Gleditsch et al.
2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). Figure 4.9 shows the number and
percentage of countries that experienced one or more years of violence in the
previous five years for each period in the sample. An average of 26 out of 53
countries experienced no conflict each five-year period, while an average of two
countries did so all five years of the period. Countries experiencing conflict for more
than half of the 21 years in the sample include Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Chad,
Democratic Congo, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan.
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FIGURE 4.9 WAR AND VIOLENCE IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Fourth, as a measure of economic openness and liberalization, I use the
change in trade openness over the previous five years for each period. These data
are from the Penn World Tables and the raw measure is the ratio of trade (exports
plus imports) to gross domestic product (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012). Figure
4.10 shows the ratio of this value to the value five years ago. The median change in
trade with respect to income gradually increased from below one to almost 1.2
(which would represent a 20 percent increase).
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FIGURE 4.10 TRADE OPENNESS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

The next control variable is HIV prevalence. Figure 4.11 shows the
distribution of HIV prevalence for each time period. Data on HIV prevalence first
became widely available around 1990, at which time the highest prevalence was
found in Zambia at 13 percent of adults. The median value rose from under one
percent in 1990 to around 2.5 percent in 2010. All of the outliers for all time periods
(save Malawi in 1990) are located in Southern Africa, illustrating the
disproportionate impact of AIDS and HIV in the region, still one of the world’s
regions most devastated by the disease.
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FIGURE 4.11 HIV PREVALENCE IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

I use the ratio of aid to income as the final control variable in the analysis.
Figure 4.12 shows that the average amount of aid to African countries has remained
around 10 percent of income for the last two decades, decreasing slightly in the 21st
century. Notable outliers include war-torn Somalia, which received aid amounting
to over half of its total income throughout the 1990s, and Liberia, which after the
end of its protracted civil war and the adoption of structural adjustment programs
in the late 2000s received aid almost equal to the total of its income, above 90
percent.
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FIGURE 4.12 OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (AID) TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Table 4.B shows the model diagnostics that directed me to the best fitting
model to use. First, a Hausman test checks for the presence of statistically
significant fixed effects (Wooldridge 2002). In the context of the present model, the
test looks for time-invariant country-specific idiosyncrasies uncaptured by the
variables included in the model. The null hypothesis of no country-specific effects is
rejected. As one would expect, the Hausman test results show the presence of
statistically significant fixed effects, so these effects should be included in the
model.8 The second and third tests address assumptions about the residuals in
longitudinal models. The Breusch-Pagan test has as its null hypothesis
homoskedasticity or constant variance of the residuals. If the errors do not have a
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constant variance (called heteroskedasticity) the standard errors of the coefficients
may be biased downward, which could lead analysts to wrongly assign statistical
significance to the coefficients (Wooldridge 2002).9 For the present model, the
Breusch-Pagan test does not reject the null hypothesis so heteroskedasticity is not
an issue. However, the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test for serial correlation in
the residuals indicates that they are correlated across time within countries. This
means that, for a given country, the best predictor for the value of its residual at
time t is the value of its residual in the previous time period (time = t-1). When this
correlation exists across time within countries, coefficient estimates are statistically
inefficient (Wooldridge 2002). The null hypothesis for this test posits no serial
correlation and here is rejected, and addressed with a variance covariance matrix
robust to serial correlation to make the estimates more efficient.
TABLE 4.B MODEL DIAGNOSTICS
Test

Ho

Hausman

Random over Fixed effects

Breusch-Pagan

Homoskedasticity

BreuschGodfrey/Wooldridge

No Serial Correlation

LaGrange Multiplier

Significant Time-fixed effects

Pesaran

No Cross-sectional
dependence

Statistics
X2(8) = 100.17
p = 0.000
X2(10) = 14.02
p = 0.172
X2(2) = 19.22
p = 0.000
F(4, 148) = 0.57
p = 0.687
Z = 1.35
p = 0.177

Result: Ho
Rejected
Not rejected
Rejected
Not rejected
Not
rejected*

*Pesaran test performed on more balanced sub-sample of data, 25 countries, 4-5 time periods (77% of
observations).

Next, the effects of time are significant according to the Lagrange Multiplier
test. This is a simple hypothesis test for significant differences across time periods.
In the present context, testing the statistical significance of time fixed effects
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addresses the question: “were development strides on average between 2005 and
2010, for example, different from those between 1990 and 1995 for African
countries?” Many African and Africanist scholars and policymakers would expect
differences across the 1990s and 2000s due to changes on the continent and
beyond. Though not exhaustive, this list includes: democratization efforts, economic
liberalization, and educational reforms domestically; increased participation in
regional economic organizations and the quick rise and relatively slower fall (in
most regions) of HIV prevalence rates; and international processes of political and
economic globalization. Supporting this idea, the null hypothesis of statistically
significant time-fixed effects is not rejected in the Lagrange Multiplier test, and timefixed effects are included in the model.
Finally, the Pesaran test of cross-sectional dependence posits its null
hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence (Wooldridge 2002). The presence of
cross-sectional dependence would indicate that the residuals were correlated
within time periods across countries, or for example, that significant events
between 1995 and 2000 caused residuals across many countries that were
significantly lower or higher than for other time periods, i.e., particularly
widespread natural disasters or conflicts, or sweeping (and effective) continental or
multi-country development policy changes. While the inclusion of time-fixed effects
helps to avoid cross-sectional dependence, the null hypothesis of the Pesaran test is
not rejected, so it is not necessary to address this issue in the model.10
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
FIGURE 4.13 MODEL RESULTS

Figure 4.13 shows the results of the second-stage fixed effects panel
regression on the deviation-from-fit measure. These results are compared to the
results of the non-instrumented model in the appendix (Table A4.F), and the model
fit statistics (adjusted R-squared and F-test) are slightly better for the instrumented
model supporting the validity of the instruments. The first research hypothesis is
supported, in that small amounts of remittance are associated with positive
development and larger amounts are negatively so. The second research hypothesis
is not supported. No significant development differences are found between
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countries with a governmental diaspora institution and those without for the two
decades in the model.
In Figure 4.13, the estimated coefficients are shown as points with 95
percent confidence intervals represented by the horizontal lines. Those lines that do
not cross zero indicate statistically significant effects in the model. Starting at the
bottom one can see that the effects for violent conflict and HIV prevalence are
negative and significant as one would expect. Violence is measured as the
proportion of the previous five years in which war or conflict took place and this
takes values from 0 to 1. The coefficient here of 0.09 reflects the nine percent
decrease (since the dependent variable is in log form) in expected development
when a country spends all five previous years in conflict rather than having five
conflict-free years. This means that countries like Burundi in 2005 or Chad in 1990
or 1995 that experienced conflict for all five previous years could have increased
development by almost 10 percent by having a peaceful five years all else equal.
Also negative and statistically significant, the coefficient for HIV prevalence is 0.015, meaning that a one percent increase in HIV prevalence predicts a one-and-ahalf percent decrease in relative development all else equal. Consider Lesotho, the
country that saw the biggest increase in HIV prevalence in the sample: the rate
moved from 14.3 percent in 1995 to 24.3 percent in 2000, an increase of 71 percent.
All else equal, had the rate of HIV prevalence in the small kingdom not increased at
all, the model predicts that Lesotho could have experienced double its observed
development progress (71 percent increase times -0.015 yields a -106.5 percent
decrease).11
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The effects of the diaspora ministries, a “partially free” Freedom House
rating, and change in trade openness are not significant. However, a “free” rating
from Freedom House is positive and significant with a coefficient of 0.05.12 Since the
“not free” rating is the base category for this categorical variable, countries rated
“free” have relative development scores (deviations-from-fit) that are five percent
higher than countries rated “not free”, ceteris paribus. This means that in 2010
nondemocratic countries like Tunisia and Guinea rated “not free” were predicted to
develop five percent more each time period had they been democracies, all else
equal.
The impacts of aid are also positive and significant, and the coefficient is 0.05.
Since both this variable and the dependent variable are measured in log form, this
estimate means that a one percent increase in aid (with respect to income) predicts
a 0.05 percent increase in relative development all else equal. For example, if
Ghana’s 2000 aid to income percentage were 10 percent (the average) rather than
the observed eight percent, all else equal this difference (a 25 percent increase)
would predict a 1.25 percent increase in Ghana’s relative development.13 While a
1.25 percent increase is admittedly slight, the model’s positive and statistically
significant result for aid does indicate that well-placed aid can be a positive force for
development.
Finally, Figure 4.13 shows three values for the coefficient for remittance
representing the 15th, 50th, and 85th percentile of observed remittance to income
ratios. Since the quadratic form of this variable is in the model, the effect changes
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dependent upon its value. These results show that small amounts of remittance are
positive and statistically significant, middle-range values are not significant, and
values toward the higher end are negative and significant, as further explained
below.
FIGURE 4.14 THE IMPACTS OF REMITTANCE

Figure 4.14 shows the distribution of remittances in the shaded histogram.
The values for the coefficient of remittances are superimposed along with 95
percent confidence intervals. The estimated coefficients for the level and quadratic
forms are -0.096 and -0.010 respectively. To find the exact turning point (when the
effect changes from positive to negative), it is necessary to find the first derivative of
-0.096x + -0.010x2. This is -4.673 in log form, and the antilog is 0.009. This means
that when remittances are 0.9 percent of GNI, their estimated effect on development
is zero, as pictured in Figure 4.14. The area inside the white vertical lines represents
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those country-years, 64 percent of the observations, in which remittances fall in the
not significant category. To the left, 32 percent of the observations fall in the
positive and significant category. Those are countries with remittances less than 0.2
percent of income like Cameroon and Ghana in the 1990s or Gabon throughout the
1990s and 2000s. Here the scale is log but I have used the actual values on the
labels, which explains the skew going to the right. The area to the right of the
(rightmost) white vertical line, 28 percent of the observations, falls in the negative
and significant category. These are country-years with remittances more than 2.5
percent of income such as Benin, Cape Verde, Egypt, and Uganda throughout the
study period. Overall, the coefficient ranges from positive 0.155 to negative 0.06.
For illustration, Table 4.C contains a summary of the changes in the ratio of
remittances to income for the two significant groups of country-years, and Figure
4.10 shows the distribution in quartiles of the dependent variable. The average
change for the lower, positive coefficient group (those countries with remittance to
income ratios less than 0.002) was 162 percent, meaning that the ratio of
remittances to income grew by more than 100 percent on average for this group.
TABLE 4.C CHANGES IN AVERAGE REMITTANCE (TO INCOME) FOR GROUPS
Group

st

rd

Min.

1 quartile

Median

3 quartile

Max.

Remit/GNI < 0.002

-53%

-27%

162%

518%

13760%

Remit/GNI > 0.025

-60%

-21%

-4%

29%

369%
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FIGURE 4.15 DISTRIBUTION OF RELATIVE DEVELOPMENT MEASURE

A

B

A country with 0.0002 ratio of remittance to income (i.e., Côte d’Ivoire or
Madagascar in the 2000s) has a coefficient of 0.07. At this level, the median increase
in the ratio of remittance to income of 100 percent would predict a seven percent
increase in development performance, and could move a country from the second to
the top quartile of development growth all else equal (represented by the arrow
marked “A” in Figure 4.15).
For countries on the bottom of Table 4.C, those that had remittance to
income ratios greater than 0.025, the average change in the remittance to income
ratio was negative four percent, a net decrease. But consider those countries like
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Cape Verde, Egypt, and Liberia who all had periods with average remittance to
income ratios around 0.15 (or remittances at 15 percent of income). The coefficient
for countries with a remittance to income ratio of 0.15 is -0.06. All else equal, if a
country with this amount of remittance (0.15 ratio to income) were to increase its
ratio to 0.19 (representing a 29 percent increase, or the 75th percentile of the
observed data, see Table 4.C), the result would be a 1.6 percent decrease in
development growth and could move a country from the second to the bottom
quartile of development (represented by the arrow marked “B” in Figure 4.15).
While a 1.6 percent decrease may seem minimal it is still a statistically significant
change in a country’s in development prospects. Small amounts of remittance with
respect to income are healthy for developing economies; larger amounts (indicating
more emigration and brain drain) hinder development growth.

SUMMARY
In this chapter, I tested two hypotheses concerning these expatriates
investigating the impacts of remittances and institutionalized diaspora engagement
on development. The results from the quantitative analysis confirm one of the two
hypotheses. Smaller amounts of remittances – less than 0.2 percent of income – are
associated with positive development growth while larger amounts – greater than
2.5 percent of income – are negatively so. The hypothesis concerning the positive
relationship between having a national governmental organization of the diaspora
and development growth is not accepted, as the estimated coefficient for that
variable is not significantly different from zero. Ancillary findings of interest include
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those for democracy and foreign aid. Both are positively and significantly related to
development growth: the model predicts that African democracies in the sample
would grow five percent more during the five year periods than nondemocracies, all
else equal; the predicted increases in development growth as a result of increasing
aid (with respect to income) are slight but support the view that well-placed aid can
support development. Unsurprisingly, violent conflict and HIV prevalence are both
negatively and statistically significantly related to development growth.
The main findings raise as many questions as they answer. Questions
answered include whether transnational remittances are associated with
development gains or losses. The answer is both. Relatively small amounts of
remittance with respect to income can be healthy for development, though many
countries – 28 percent of the observations, countries like Benin, Cape Verde, Egypt,
and Uganda – received more than 2.5 percent of income in remittances. The results
suggest that, ceteris paribus, in these countries would have achieved more
development growth had remittances been a smaller portion of income. Questions
raised by these results include those of policy alternatives and best practices for
developing governments in Africa in dealing with migration, diasporas, and
remittances. Which policy options exist for mitigating the negative impacts of
emigration and brain-drain in countries that suffer from disproportionate losses in
human capital? How can developing country governments help to leverage
remittances for development?
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Moreover, how can governments harness the potential of their diasporas for
development at home? Can the new national level governmental diaspora ministries
and offices create effective and enduring transnational public-private linkages? How
can they meet the challenges they face: inconsistencies across regime changes and
the lack of capacity, coordination, and data? These questions and others are
addressed in the following chapter.
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NOTES: CHAPTER FOUR
The 34 LDCs in Africa are: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Democratic Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, São
Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and
Zambia.
2 The conversion of actual GNP into purchasing power parities allows direct comparisons across
countries and time periods. The choice to use GNP over GDP is a conscious one. While GDP
represents the volume of production within a state including foreign companies, GNP represents all
income produced by a state’s nationals and their businesses, regardless of their location. The
deepening of economic globalization and increasing migration support using gross national products
rather than gross domestic ones as a more accurate measure of economic productivity. Purchasing
power parity data for Africa are most complete in the Penn World Tables, more so than that of the
World Bank or International Monetary Fund, hence the choice to use these data.
3 The BRICS countries are: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
4 Countries in each regional classification are shown in the appendix, Table A4. A.
5 South Sudan gained sovereignty in 2011 and is therefore not included here.
6 The two measures, GNI and GNP are theoretically equivalent, though GNI measures income received
(wages and dividends) and GNP measures income produced (sales) (Hirschman 2012). In general,
the differences are slight, and the two, for which data are available, are highly correlated for the
country-years I use here.
7 Also following the IMF and common practice when working with income and other monetary
variables, I employ the natural logarithm of the ratio of remittances to income. This helps achieve a
“more” linear relationship between predictors and results and curbs the influence of outlying values.
8 Statistically, the actual formal null hypothesis for the Hausman test states that there is no difference
between two models: a random effects model and a fixed effects model. When no statistically
significant difference is found, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and the random effects
estimator is more efficient and parsimonious, and thus analysts should choose random over fixed
effects. However, analysts should also make theoretically conscious choices between random and
fixed effects models. For example, in the present model the Hausman test shows the presence of
statistically significant country effects, though most if not all comparative scholars would argue that
any group of 43 developing countries face diverse challenges for development and also confront
these challenges through myriad strategies. In the absence of 1) perfect or near-perfect information
and 2) the ability to operationalize this information into quantitatively measurable data, analysts
should generally use fixed effects (Clark and Linzer 2012; Wooldridge 2002).
9 This condition can be addressed with a heteroskedasticity-robust variance covariance matrix for
the coefficients.
10 Cross-sectional dependence, like heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, can be addressed by
calculating a variance covariance matrix for the coefficients robust to the specific diagnostic
challenge. In general, calculating robust variance covariance matrices results in larger standard
errors for coefficients, making statistical significance more difficult to achieve.
11 To explain, the coefficient for HIV prevalence is -0.015. This represents a 1.5 percent decrease in
development (deviation from fit) expected for a one percent increase in HIV prevalence (after the
conversion for the log-level relationship). Thus the observed increase of 71 percent in HIV
prevalence for the Basotho from 1995 to 2000 is associated with a 106.5 percent decrease in
development gains. This indicates that, all else equal, Lesotho’s development gains could have been
over 100 percent of those observed, thereby doubling any observed progress. In this particular case,
Lesotho had a development deviation from fit of -0.17, meaning that it experienced a shortfall
relative to its 1995 development index value, which was 0.47 and approximately equal to the mean
value for that time period (see Figure A4.1 in Chapter Four Appendix). Increasing the observed
shortfall by 106.5 percent results in 0.181) and would yield a net excess for Lesotho in 2000 of 0.01.
1
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Recall that countries receiving “free” ratings scored relatively high on two indexes: one for political
rights and one for civil liberties. Index values are calculated with responses to expert surveys from
each country and contain sub-scores including those for freedom in executive and legislative
electoral processes, political pluralism and participation, government functioning, associational
rights, freedom of expression, religion, and academe (Freedom House 2011).
13 Increasing Ghana’s 2000 aid to income percentage from eight to the average of ten percent of
income is an increase of 25 percent (0.10 – 0.8 = 0.2; 0.2/0.8 = 0.25) this increase would predict a
1.25 percent increase in relative development all else equal.
12
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APPENDIX: CHAPTER FOUR
TABLE A4.A REGIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS
Central
Eastern
Northern Southern
Angola
Cameroon
Central African
Chad
Republic
Congo
Democratic Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Sao Tome & Principe

Burundi
Comoros
Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritius
Mozambique
Rwanda
Seychelles
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Algeria
Egypt
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
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Botswana
Lesotho
Namibia
South Africa
Swaziland

Western
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde
Côte d’Ivoire
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
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TABLE A4.B INCOME BY 2010 RANK
GNPppp pc

Average Annual Growth

Rank Country
1980
2010
1980s
1990s
$6,265
$32,322
8%
5%
1 Seychelles
$9,641*
$20,227
-4%
2%
2 Libya
$7,130
$13,005
1%
0%
3 Gabon
$1,482
$10,515
11%
6%
4 Mauritius
$1,484
$10,285
13%
5%
5 Botswana
$3,016
$8,730
2%
3%
6 South Africa
$376
$7,165
-2%
32%
7 Equatorial Guinea
$1,825
$7,147
4%
4%
8 Tunisia
$2,694
$6,933
2%
2%
9 Algeria
$1,984
$5,831
4%
2%
10 Namibia
$831
$5,314
4%
5%
11 Angola
$779
$5,161
9%
6%
12 Egypt
$1,397
$4,047
8%
1%
13 Swaziland
$989
$4,032
6%
3%
14 Morocco
$474
$3,945
9%
6%
15 Cape Verde
$1,500
$2,996
2%
1%
16 Djibouti
$647
$2,558
4%
3%
17 Mauritania
$591
$2,328
3%
3%
18 Sudan
$760
$2,251
2%
4%
19 Ghana
$604
$2,084
6%
2%
20 Lesotho
$803
$2,035
5%
1%
21 Cameroon
$556
$2,002
2%
4%
22 Zambia
$788
$1,975
4%
5%
23 Congo
$923
$1,842
1%
1%
24 Sao Tome & Principe
$578
$1,640
5%
2%
25 Senegal
$255
$1,626
8%
1%
26 Chad
$790
$1,474
-1%
4%
27 Nigeria
$529
$1,461
4%
3%
28 Kenya
$707
$1,386
1%
2%
29 Cote d`Ivoire
$551
$1,376
5%
2%
30 Gambia
$332
$1,313
4%
2%
31 Tanzania
$463
$1,294
5%
3%
32 Benin
$265
$1,268
5%
6%
33 Uganda
$558
$1,216
4%
-1%
34 Rwanda
$351
$1,149
4%
3%
35 Burkina Faso
$288
$1,100
6%
3%
36 Mali
$496
$1,033
3%
-3%
37 Sierra Leone
$657
$973
3%
-1%
38 Comoros
$450
$905
5%
-1%
39 Guinea-Bissau
$349
$891
4%
3%
40 Guinea
$553
$860
2%
0%
41 Togo
$235
$855
1%
4%
42 Mozambique
$244
$810
3%
2%
43 Ethiopia
$534
$807
1%
1%
44 Madagascar
$369
$791
1%
1%
45 Malawi
$602*
$699
n/a
3%
46 Eritrea
$329
$674
4%
2%
47 Central African Republic
$428
$549
0%
0%
48 Niger
$311
$487
4%
-2%
49 Somalia
$253
$452
5%
-2%
50 Burundi
$656
$404
-6%
10%
51 Liberia
$195
$359
5%
-1%
52 Zimbabwe
$302
$263
0%
-5%
53 Democratic Congo
*First column data for Libya and Eritrea are from 1985 and 1992 respectively
Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012 (Penn World Tables)

2000s
5%
9%
8%
4%
4%
6%
17%
6%
6%
6%
16%
5%
4%
7%
7%
6%
8%
8%
6%
6%
4%
10%
6%
6%
4%
13%
6%
4%
4%
3%
8%
3%
6%
8%
6%
5%
9%
2%
4%
3%
3%
9%
8%
2%
7%
0%
3%
2%
3%
3%
0%
3%
5%
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TABLE A4.C EXTREME VALUES FOR DEVELOPMENT INDEX
Indicator
Minimum
Expected Years of Schooling for Children (years)
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)

0
20

Income (GNP PPP per capita)

$100

Sources: UNDP 2011; Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012

FIGURE A4.1 DEVELOPMENT INDEX, 1980 – 2010
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Maximum
18
(Australia 2010)
83.2
(Japan 2010)
$141,204
(Qatar 2010)
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TABLE A4.D COUNTRY-YEARS INCLUDED IN MODEL
= INCLUDED

ALGERIA
ANGOLA
BENIN

BOTSWANA
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CAPE VERDE
C.A.R.
CHAD
COMOROS
CONGO
CÔTE D’IVOIRE
D.R.C.
DJIBOUTI
EGYPT
EQ. GUINEA
ERITREA
ETHIOPIA
GABON
GAMBIA
GHANA
GUINEA
GUINEA-BISSAU
KENYA
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
LIBYA
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALI
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MOROCCO
MOZAMBIQUE
NAMIBIA
NIGER
NIGERIA
RWANDA
SAO T & P
SENEGAL
SEYCHELLES
SIERRA LEONE
SOMALIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SUDAN
SWAZILAND
TANZANIA
TOGO
TUNISIA
UGANDA
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE

= NOT INCLUDED

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

= INCLUDED

ALGERIA
ANGOLA
BENIN
BOTSWANA
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CAPE VERDE
C.A.R.
CHAD
COMOROS
CONGO
CÔTE D’IVOIRE
D.R.C.
DJIBOUTI
EGYPT
EQ. GUINEA
ERITREA
ETHIOPIA
GABON
GAMBIA
GHANA
GUINEA
GUINEA-BISSAU
KENYA
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
LIBYA
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALI
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MOROCCO
MOZAMBIQUE
NAMIBIA
NIGER
NIGERIA
RWANDA
SAO T & P
SENEGAL
SEYCHELLES
SIERRA LEONE
SOMALIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SUDAN
SWAZILAND
TANZANIA
TOGO
TUNISIA
UGANDA
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE

= NOT INCLUDED
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TABLE A4.E RESULTS FROM INSTRUMENTING AND DEVIATION-FROM-FIT MODELS
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TABLE A4.F MODEL COMPARISONS (INSTRUMENTS)
(Dependent Variable = development, deviation-fromfit)
Model
I
II
Remit

…

0.012

…

(0.014)

Remit2

…

0.000

…

(0.001)

Remit(fitted)

-0.096*

…

(0.026)

…

Remit(fitted)2

-0.010*

…

(0.003)

…

…

0.032*

0.054*

…

(0.010)

…

-0.001

-0.007

HIV prevalence

-0.015*

-0.013*

War/Violence

-0.086*

-0.072*

Aid

…

Aid(fitted)
Gov’t Diaspora Inst.

(0.013)
(0.005)
(0.036)

∆ Trade Openness
Political constraints
FH: Partially Free

0.021

(0.017)

0.065

(0.009)

(0.012)
(0.004)
(0.036)

0.015

(0.017)

0.030

(0.042)

(0.038)

0.004

-0.004

(0.009)

(0.010)

FH: Free

0.049*

Adj. R-sq.
F(9, 110)
p<F
N

0.170
0.146
3.681*
3.012*
0.000
0.002
162 (i=43, t= 2-5)

(0.021)

0.035

(0.023)

Time-fixed effects significant in both models (not shown).
*p < 0.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DEVELOPMENT FROM ABROAD?
Remittances from diasporic African communities present opportunities and
challenges for economic, social, and political development. At the start of the
twenty-first century, members of the diaspora remit around $50 billion to Africa
annually – more than one-third of the continent’s transnational capital receipts.
Despite increasing remittance flows and the emergence of governmental diaspora
agencies development goals remain largely unattained: 34 of Africa’s 54 states
continue to be designated by the UN as least developed countries. Nevertheless
there are variations between regions and countries. North African countries have
been able to capitalize on their hydrocarbon resources, proximity to Southern
Europe, and historical geopolitical importance to increase the pace of development.
The small island nations of the Seychelles and Mauritius have exploited their
comparative advantages in tourism and financial services. Namibia and South Africa,
which ended long costly conflicts in the 1990s, have embarked on stabilizing their
political institutions and diversifying economic infrastructures. In the west, the
petro-state of Ghana is re-engaging its domestic and diasporic constituents for
national development and greater improvement in living conditions for its people.
This dissertation’s comparative analysis of remittance inflows and national
development growth in 43 African countries revealed ambiguous and complex
relationships. Remittances are, at times, negatively related to development and, at
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other times, positively so. Put differently, remittances are neither requisites nor
absolute deterrents of development. As discussed throughout this dissertation and
largely due to the significant increase of monetary remittances, 36 governments
have institutionalized efforts to engage diasporas through creating formal national
diaspora ministries and/or offices. 1 In addition to sending money home, members
of the diaspora provide skills, expertise, and many other services for national
development efforts. Diaspora institutions meet with diaspora groups at home and
abroad, disseminate economic and policy information, maintain diaspora skills
databases, and offer investment incentives for development projects. Below is a
summary of findings followed by a brief discussion of these findings for a deeper
understanding of the short-term and long-term significance of the role of
remittances and diaspora communities in the economic, social, and political
development of twenty-first century African countries.
SUMMARY
This research focused on testing two hypotheses. The first hypothesis held
that for African states, small amounts of remittances in relation to income would be
positively associated with development and that larger amounts would be
negatively so. The second hypothesis argued that states with a national diaspora
ministry or office would experience more development growth than those without
such an institution.
In contrast to conventional assumptions that African economies are
dependent on foreign aid, the analysis in Chapter One showed not only did
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continental remittance receipts exceed aid in 2007, but that they also surpassed
foreign investment in 2010. Transnational capital inflows to Africa, when compared
to other developing regions, are unique in that remittances surpass both foreign aid
and investment only to Africa. By 2010, African countries received an average of $80
million remitted through formal transaction agencies annually. Significantly, these
findings demonstrate that diasporic Africans send more money to the continent
than international financial institutions or multinational corporations.
Chapter Two reexamined theoretical discourse and debates that until the
1990s oscillated between periods of prevailing optimism or pessimism regarding
migration and remittances in promoting development.2 It highlighted the more
recent emergence of an increasingly complex dialogue that significantly shifted
focus from individuals to households and enduring transnational linkages.3 This
shift allowed the discourse to move beyond debates of remittances and migration as
either helpful or harmful for development. With growing levels of global and
regional remittances, empirical studies of remittance impacts have become more
common. The chapter found that while most studies at the household level of
analysis concluded that remittances were helpful for receiving families, studies of
national level impacts more commonly found remittances inhibitive for
development. However, the majority of remittance and development studies
operationalized national development narrowly as economic growth, and ignored
impacts of remittances on social development, for example education and
healthcare. In light of empirical evidence that 80 percent of remittances from the
diaspora are spent on food, shelter, health, and education,4 the emergent school-of134
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thought that concluded remittances were detrimental for national development
demanded a closer scrutiny. In addition, the review addressed the challenges for
new governmental diaspora institutions and found that regime changes and
inadequate data, intergovernmental coordination, and lack of resources plague
many of the agencies.
Chapter Three analyzed the political economy of remittance in Africa. Data
revealed that many of the 30 million Africans who emigrated from their countries
remained on the continent, and two of the top five destination countries were Côte
d’Ivoire and South Africa.5 It presented a discussion of the challenges of “braindrain”, the formal and informal mechanisms available to remitters, and the
structural limitations in receiving countries. The chapter identified top remittance
receivers like Gambia and Cape Verde, with an estimated 10 percent of income in
remittances accompanied by the loss over 60 percent of their tertiary-educated
populations to outmigration.6 In addition, the chapter explored underlying social
and market conditions that influenced choices between formal and informal
remittance channels. It identified three major institutional challenges: the world’s
fewest banks and ATMs per person, a duopolistic remittance service provider
market with the world’s highest fees, and restrictive international and national
policy environments that inhibit change.7 The chapter also provided context for the
emergence of national level government diaspora institutions – the first in 1988,
Office of Tunisians Abroad to the latest, Equatorial Guinea’s Directorate of Diaspora
Affairs established in 2013. It reviewed their structures, missions, and strategies as
well as their focus on building organizational capacity.
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Chapter Four quantitatively analyzed the impacts of remittances and
governmental diaspora agencies on African nations’ development using data from
43 states from 1990 to 2010. It operationalized development as an index of three
indicators: education, health, and income. Testing the hypotheses through
longitudinal regression analysis exposed a more complex and nuanced relationship
between remittance and development than previous studies. The findings of this
dissertation indicate that while small amounts of remittances – up to 0.2 percent of
income – can help development, larger quantities do the opposite. Controlling for
development level in 1990 and other relevant social, economic, and political
conditions,8 nation-states like Botswana and Tanzania that receive around 0.2
percent of income in remittances make larger development strides than either
Gambia or Togo where remittances are around 10 percent of income. While the
analysis in Chapter Four found that the development differences between countries
with and without governmental diaspora ministries/offices were not statistically
significant, it significantly showed that all else being equal, democratic African
countries (as rated by Freedom House) like Ghana and Mauritius made larger
advances toward development than nondemocracies. The findings of this chapter
point to even more complex linkages of economic and political development factors
with not only the receiving of remittances but the institutional mechanisms that
promote or inhibit flows of funds by national political and financial institutions.
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DISCUSSION
Now more than ever, Africans in the diaspora possess the potential to shape
Africa’s development. This dissertation investigated the broad question of whether
“development from abroad” is possible for African states through remittances and
institutionalized diaspora engagement. The answer is yes and no. The impacts of
almost $50 billion in remittances received annually are diverse and of course
depend on the contexts in which they are exchanged. Beyond sending money to
friends and family, members of the diaspora offer skills, services, and technical
expertise to their countries of origin that contribute to development.
Institutionalizing government relations with these potential agents of development
may seem like an obvious step in the right direction.
Increasingly, diasporic communities and their contributions occupy a more
central place in national development strategies, yet the short-term and long-term
impacts of their remittances remain constrained by structural deficiencies and lack
of institutional mechanisms to translate the transacted funds into concrete
development factors. The dissertation found no statistically significant difference
between the development patterns of states with and without governmental
diaspora institutions. Many possible factors exist to explain this finding. First,
governments like South Africa successfully engage diasporic communities through
numerous extant agencies. For some states, the creation of an institution dedicated
to the diaspora would be redundant. Second, national diaspora ministries and
offices are young, especially in bureaucratic terms: in 2010 their average age was
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less than six years. Many struggle to build capacity in environments characterized
by few resources and poor intergovernmental coordination. Third, agencies are
varied both in structure and bureaucratic position, and these variations create
different opportunities and unique challenges. Fourth, diasporas are diverse. Each
government has a unique history of relations with its diaspora, and each diaspora
includes a unique combination of supporters and opponents of current
administrations as well as different and diverse skills, expertise, and resources.
All of the characteristics above render generalizing about the institutions (as
quantitative analysis attempts) more difficult. Yet, this study points to common
development objectives of governmental diaspora institutions. Two major goals
emerge: (1) to leverage expatriate remittances, skills, and transnational linkages for
development, and (2) to diminish the deleterious effects of outmigration such as
brain-drain and potential dependence on remittances. Identifying these shared
objectives for diaspora agencies in Africa provides new indicators for future studies
with which to measure the capacities of governmental diaspora institutions.
African diasporas continue to grow accompanied by various types of
governmental diaspora institutions seeking to formulate new strategies to re-invest
finances and utilize skills in creative ways. My brief fieldwork in Ethiopia revealed
that its Diaspora Directorate has been successful in offering foreign currency
accounts with attractive interest rates and selling diaspora bonds, and in receiving
investments for development projects from Ethiopian nationals abroad. These
strategies have been influenced by similar and successful programs in India.9
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However, the current trend in Africa to create national-level agencies tasked
with engaging the diaspora for development is at its early stages. Though diaspora
agencies may become effective in facilitating development in the future, the findings
suggest that African nations’ development objectives may be better spent on
creating jobs and political spaces for civil society engagement that may inhibit
outward migration. Development strategies predicated on high levels of emigration
are not sustainable options. Inadequate social and economic institutions (i.e., poor
school systems, undiversified economic sectors, and a lack of public safety nets), and
political instability constrict development and fuel increased diaspora formation.
Nevertheless, there exists potential for development if governments are able to
formulate proactive policies such as expansion of affordable educational
institutions, broadening of employment choices, and increasing transparency, along
with the engagement of diasporic communities.
Paradoxically, diasporic earning powers are based on a perpetuation of
cycles that drain African countries of their skilled citizens and youth. From a
political development perspective, the increasing involvement of the diaspora in the
social and economic sphere can serve as a disincentive for governments to the most
basic of responsibilities of governance such as protection and provision of basic
social services. Diasporic communities’ contributions in building schools and
medical centers and providing funds for doctors, nurses, and dentists in rural areas
should not prevent governments from building necessary institutions and
infrastructure in these sectors. Evasion of traditionally public responsibilities could
increasingly become an option for governments in countries where diasporas
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provide more and more social services. A more judicious coordination of diaspora
contributions with long-term national development projects could lead to a solution
for both African governments and their citizens at home and abroad.
Indeed, looking toward 2015 and the “euphoria” surrounding the
development potential of diasporas along with rising remittances and diaspora
involvement since 2000, one may be forgiven for assuming that after a decade-anda-half development outcomes would be stellar. 10 However, growth in median
national remittance receipts from $10 million to $80 million since 2000 has not
brought many African countries much closer to meeting development goals. In fact,
the dissertation findings showed that African countries with relatively small
remittance receipts demonstrated larger development gains than those who
received larger remittances (more than 2.5 percent of income). Growing
dependence upon remittances prolonged by cycles of outmigration, brain-drain, lack
of affordable education, and sluggish economic growth, does not bode well for
African development. Empirical findings indicating that countries receiving high
levels of remittance develop more slowly than others may only provide partial
answers to questions concerning the complex relationship of remittances and
national development.
This dissertation’s findings highlight a little-noted fact of critical importance
to African development: diasporic Africans remit more funds than are invested by
MNCs or loaned by international financial institutions. Attention to the role of
diasporic communities therefore is timely and worthy of deeper examination.
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Viewed in comparative terms, it calls our attention to similarities and differences
between Africa’s diasporic communities and those of Asia. Furthermore, the
acknowledgement of African diasporic communities by national governments points
to new arenas of policymaking that intertwine challenges of globalization,
democratization, and socioeconomic development. The pursuit of this complex set
of policymaking goals also indicates the potential for innovative ways of rebuilding
state-society relations.
This dissertation also raises a major question about the role of African
governments: what types of governmental policies are needed when remittances
constitute the sole safety net for citizens? These de facto forms of social insurance
may help to keep citizens complacent but are not without costs. Accessible and
equitable financial services are necessary in the age of globalization. Neoliberal
thinking might argue that government should stay out of the remittance business.
However, creating policies to help reduce barriers-to-entry into remittance markets
for MTOs besides Western Union and MoneyGram and to increase access in newer
more competitive markets could transform the impacts of remittances.
Furthermore, indirectly managing migration through policymaking and capacitybuilding in social institutions could see more citizens thrive and be more likely to
become agents of development at home.
LOOKING FORWARD
African democracies and nondemocracies have created governmental
diaspora agencies. With few exceptions, the institutions are new and more research
141
Chapter 5

Development from Abroad?

is needed to identify their challenges, successes, and failures. Specifically, studies of
diaspora members and groups both inside and outside of Africa who are working or
have worked directly with the new governmental institutions could provide
empirical data on diasporic contributions in the first decade-and-a-half of the
twenty-first century. Furthermore, case studies of various African diasporic
communities and the mechanisms and institutions that transact remittances would
shed light on institutional barriers to productive engagement of diasporas in
development. Combining case-study approaches with empirically-based research
could serve to compile useful guides for best practices for national development
projects beyond 2015.
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NOTES: CHAPTER FIVE
For details about diaspora ministries and offices, see Table A3.H, page 86.
See especially de Haas 2010 and Gamlen 2010.
3 See Glick Schiller 2003, 2009 and Massey et al 1993.
4 See pages 11-12 and Bardouille 2008.
5 See Figure 3.1 and pages 55-57.
6 See Table 3.A and pages 69-71.
7 See pages 58-66.
8 The control variables included the Political Constraints Index, Freedom House ratings, foreign aid,
trade growth, violent conflict, HIV prevalence. For descriptions see pages 99-113.
9 Fieldwork in Addis Ababa in July 2013. Specific investment opportunities for Ethiopian nationals at
the time mostly pertained to the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam. India has sold over $10
billion in diaspora bonds which has been re-invested into national development projects. For more
information, see pages 73-75 and Aguinas 2009.
10 See Mitchell 2006.
1
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